EPLF/TPLF AND ETHIOPIA-ERITREA TODAYSow the wind; reap the whirlwindNegussay AyeleINTRODUCTIONAs background to the theme of this article, we begin with an international news dispatch from Addis Ababa as well as a brief profile of major happenings in Ethiopia since mid-March 2001. Nita Bhalla, the BBC correspondent in Addis Ababa, dispatched a report dated 17 April 2001. Her eyewitness account, headlined “Brutal attack by Addis Ababa police,” was as follows: “Hundreds of Ethiopian riot police armed with batons and riot shields stormed central Addis Ababa today, beating up civilians including women and children. A wing of the Ethiopian police, known as the ‘special forces’ were called in to break up a riot which erupted when a peaceful demonstration turned into a violent protest, The scenes I witnessed in the Arat Kilo area of Addis Ababa can only be described as brutal. The riot police arrived at the scene at 1300 local time (1000 GMT) when a group of about 100 civilians outside the Addis Ababa University campus started throwing rocks and bottles at police. The special forces took charge of the situation, which was beyond the control of the regular police force. They trapped the rioters along a small road before charging at them from all directions. As the rioters dispersed, the special force officers pursued them beating them mercilessly, even as the rioters surrendered and pleaded with them to stop. Many lay motionless on the ground as the police continued to beat and kick them. Some of the officers stormed the homes of civilians living and working in the area, looking for more of the rioters, but finding none, they began beating women and young children. As I tried to record the screams of the women they turned on me and began pushing and shoving me out of the way. They snatched my camera as I tried to take pictures of the atrocities, saying that I should not portray Ethiopia to the world in this way. When I protested, they grabbed the sound recorder and threw it to the ground smashing it to pieces. The rioters, who were not students, say they sympathized with the weeklong boycott of classes by over 3000 university students, (who) have been demanding the removal of armed police from campus.” (Cf. also her summary report—“Anarchy in Addis”--in the BBC magazine, Focus on Africa, July-September, 2001 issue). Among
the avalanche of news items on Ethiopia flooding the wires since
mid-March, were reports of internal splits
among the elites of the TPLF regime and the subsequent eviction of the
dissidents from their Central and Executive Committee positions within
TPLF. Subsequently, several high-ranking TPLF officials and military
brass and functionaries of clone parties were not only dismissed but in
some cases incarcerated as well. The TPLF regime used the political
turmoil within its ranks as a pretext to kill and repress students and
virtually wipe out a budding alternative party formation called
Ethiopians’ Democratic Party (EDP). The regime even jailed and
harassed the venerable human rights campaigner, Professor Mesfin
Woldemariam, as well as an upstanding economist, Dr. Berhanu Nega, on
trumped up charges that they incited student riots. Local press also had
a bombshell. There were a series of announcements that up and down the
ranks of the TPLF, several prominent persons--including one of the top
TPLF guerrilla veteran with
six members of his family--were indicted on corruption charges. Dozens
of business owners and managers were also apprehended indicating that
corruption was endemic in the system. The corruption spree did not start
recently, and it is not limited to those rounded up today. Unless the
hunt is halted deliberately--as those now in jail are intimating--there
will be a lot more culprits all the way to the highest pedestals of the
ladder of rampant TPLF corruption. Meanwhile, the regime braced itself
to acknowledging Ethiopian casualties of upwards of 100,000 in its
two-year war with EPLF, while EPLF owned up to sustaining only a fifth
of that figure.
There was yet another drama with TPLF’s puppet Oromo party called OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic Front), which boasts of having one of its own, Dr Negasso Gidada, as the titular President or head of state of the TPLF regime in Ethiopia. At a Central Committee meeting of the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front), which is the TPLF’s Trojan Horse in Ethiopia, there were sparks between Prime Minister Meles and some OPDO functionaries. The PM is reported to have berated OPDO that ‘if one scratches one of your sides, you are OPDO, and when one scratches the other side, you are OLF (Oromo Liberation Front)--two sides of the same coin.” One participant is said to have responded: “the bottom line is, we are Oromo.” At that cantankerous meeting, President Negasso is quoted as having told PM Meles that the more he observed his behavior lately, “the more he looked to him like Mengistu Hailemariam.” Those were tough words hurled at the PM. Even the bitter dissident comrades in his own Tigrayan camp have not yet gone that far. Meanwhile, the UN-managed task of sealing the borders between TPLF-Ethiopia and EPLF-Eritrea has been moving slowly with its own hiccups and snarls. As I have said in my last Commentary on the Internet, the UN has a trump card it can use in the form of the advance default (12/12/2000 Algiers) agreement by the parties concerned to accept what it decides on the borders. Either side can then spin the outcome to be in their respective favor. It is safe to say that given the premises and provisions of the TPLF/EPLF compact, the predestined result with regard to any boundary delimitation is to the advantage of EPLF-Eritrea and to the detriment of Ethiopia--although not to TPLF per se. As
we shall elaborate later on, Eritrean capobanda Issayass Afewerki is
also having his own troubles with dissidents in his regime, mirroring
what the TPLF/EPRDF autocracy is going through in the rest of Ethiopia.
At the moment, his Eritrea, which was touted by some as “miracleland,”
remains more of a nightmareland. A number of his once loyal entourage
and comrades-in-arms as well as ambassadors, ministers and long-time
supporters have abandoned his camp and are calling for fair and
democratic elections in the hope that he will go out quietly. So, at the
moment it is a toss-up as to who will exit first—PR Issayass or PM
Meles. What is certain, however, is that
EPLF/PFDJ and TPLF/EPRDF are now exhausted, beleaguered, bankrupt,
vulnerable and moribund. Both are in the same leaking, sinking raft.
How did it all come to this? To answer this question correctly, it is
necessary to examine at least the main contours of the tandem handiwork
of EPLF and TPLF in Ethiopia-Eritrea from 1991 to 1998. EPLF
and TPLF are together responsible for what happened in TPLF-Ethiopia
during this period. By the same token, EPLF-Eritrea would not have
survived, let alone thrived, had it not been for its unfettered
exploitation (or “pillaging,” as one writer put it), of Ethiopia
during those years. The TPLF made this possible by its obsequious
facilitation, collaboration, protection, funding and diplomatic courier
service for EPLF. To
be sure, until 1998 the EPLF and TPLF were co-rulers of TPLF-Ethiopia,
while TPLF itself had no say in how EPLF-Eritrea was run. Its sole
function was to loyally service the needs and biddings of EPLF. It is of
some significance to note that Mr. Issayass and Mr.
Meles (whose birth name is Legesse), the current rulers of
Ethiopia-Eritrea, are of mixed Tigrayan and Eritrean parentage. Serving
the interests of EPLF and its claim to the Eritrean region of Ethiopia
was always the primary concern of the current TPLF ruler(s). An
indication of this is the fact that its 331-page major signature
document, published in Ethiopic in 1987, was about The Struggle of
the Eritrean People: From Where to Where, not about the ‘Struggle
of the Ethiopian people’ at large. In point of fact, as I have noted
frequently in my earlier writings on these themes, what we have in the
top echelons of EPLF and TPLF is tragically a generation committed to Death
to Ethiopia, whereas their forebears were dedicated to the cause of Ethiopia
or Death. The ongoing dissentions and defections among the top
echelons of TPLF and EPLF may reveal some of the mysteries of why the
TPLF was more beholden to EPLF-Eritrean secessionist interests than of
Ethiopian national interests. But for now, all are condemned to sustain
the consequences of the policies and actions of their rulers. When all
is said and done the war and political aftermath swirling in
Ethiopia-Eritrea in the last couple of years is, therefore, neither
accidental nor coincidental. Rather, it is the direct inexorable
consequence or boomerang of the treachery and collusion of EPLF and TPLF
perpetrated unconscionably for seven very long on the peoples of
Ethiopia-Eritrea.
EPLF
AND TPLF SOW THEIR WINDS IN ETHIOPIA: 1991-1998 a) Sowing martial winds After nearly a decade of unchallenged and unrestrained autocratic rule, the TPLF regime began to sustain chinks in its armor and cracks in its façade. The most fundamental defining characteristic of TPLF hegemony in Ethiopia is its monopoly of lethal force. This was true when it defeated the Derg and assumed power in Addis Ababa in 1991, and it is true today. In a 1997 article, “What Naeft (the gun) Can Do…” I had said that the TPLF and EPLF did not win militarily (in 1991) because their cause was right, but they could assert their cause right because they won militarily. By the same token, the TPLF junta continues to rule in Ethiopia today because of its monopoly of force and its unchallenged capacity to use it with impunity. It is not rule of law, democracy, cultural mores, ethical principles, moral scruples or other civil factors that condition or sustain TPLF tribal hegemony. The regime has no legitimacy, no accountability, no transparency, no mandate or popularity among the vast majority of Ethiopians. It came to power by the barrel of the gun, and it continues to rule over Ethiopia through the gun or Naeft virtually as an occupation army. The foundation of its rule is unmitigated lethal force. All other things are window dressings and propaganda ploys packaged for outside--mostly callous, gullible or gratuitous--audiences. These elements and governments apparently do not have compelling ethical principles or overriding national interests to question or challenge the manifest brutality of TPLF military hegemony in Ethiopia today. In one of its issues, the Amharic magazine, Tobia, had cited the recently martyred surgeon, Professor Asrat Woldeyes, having asked out loud in a speech (paraphrased): “
How is it that those Western governments that could find and criticize
even pin-sized evil deeds deep inside piles of rubble in pitch darkness
during the Derg regime, cannot today see and acknowledge the TPLF’s
elephant sized evil deeds
on the highway, in broad daylight?”
The
astounding behavior of those governments that support TPLF and EPLF in
the face of all that has been happening against the vast majority of the
peoples of Ethiopia-Eritrea, is a subject that needs treatment by
itself. Political and economic dimensions of TPLF rule in its Ethiopia,
which we shall discuss below, emanate from and are based on its
exclusive martial prowess. To miss this point is to confuse the
“wax” and the “gold” of realpolitik
in Ethiopia-Eritrea today. Outsiders may--even knowingly--miss it, but
Ethiopians cannot afford to do so. Take
away its military pillar and the minority TPLF regime, which operates
from Addis Ababa as an occupation junta, will instantly crumble like a
house of cards. Force is the
premise of power in Ethiopia today much as it has been in the past.
Others may not appreciate this fundamental point, but the high priests
of the regime know exactly what we are talking about here. The problem
is, even though they know this undeniable reality, TPLF stalwarts do not
acknowledge it. Instead, they keep vending blatant lies to the outside
world that unlike previous regimes, the TPLF has brought “democracy”
to Ethiopia for the first time; it has put in place an “elected”
“civilian” “federal” government; there is “rule of law,”
“free press” and “respect for human rights” in the country. The
TPLF says nothing about its monopoly of lethal force. However, it has
declared that no opposition group should wage armed struggle against its
hegemony. In bygone days, some Western governments had enjoined the ANC
from waging armed struggle against the bestial apartheid regime in South
Africa. In the end, it was a combination of armed struggle and political
agitation at home as well as diplomatic pressures and limited economic
sanctions abroad that brought about the demise of apartheid. Those same
governments also endorse today TPLF’s call for the renunciation of the
use of force by everyone else except
itself in Ethiopia. In other words, the struggle in the country is
to be between armed TPLF (alias
EPRDF) and unarmed alternative groups. That is how--as remarked once in Africa
Confidential--“the poachers became the gamekeepers” in Ethiopia. It
is to be recalled that the 1991 London Conference relating to political
transition in Ethiopia, convened by then US Under-Secretary for African
Affairs, Mr. Herman Cohen, set the tone of things to come in Addis Ababa
and Asmara. (See his brief rendition of the affair in his Intervening
in Africa, 2000). “Negotiations” on the future of Ethiopia were
to be confined to EPLF, TPLF, OLF and the PDRE (Peoples Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia) because they were all armed groups. Other
political bodies and parties that had been carrying on political
struggles for varying periods of time were not allowed to participate
because they did not have armed presence in the country. Immediately
after EPLF and TPLF guerrillas occupied Asmara (May 24) and Addis Ababa
(May 28) respectively, their first order of business was to
“charter” the secession of EPLF-Eritrea from Ethiopia. To ensure
EPLF control of its Eritrea and Tigrayan minority hegemony over the rest
of Ethiopia, the TPLF had to have monopoly over arms in the country.
Whatever arms and military installations the EPLF and TPLF could not
immediately haul to Eritrea and Tigray or otherwise control were
destroyed. Most of the choice sophisticated military hardware of
Ethiopia, went to EPLF, the senior partner of the cabal. The Ethiopian
army, air force, navy and other national security establishments that
had taken half a century to build, were completely pillaged and
dismantled. Hundreds of thousands of employees of these state structures
were killed, interned, exiled, or thrown into the streets penniless with
their families. However,
the TPLF and EPLF had considerable difficulty demobilizing the OLF--the
junior London partner in the cabal to dismember Ethiopia, and bloody
battles took place between their forces. Many thousands of OLF elements
and sympathizers were incarcerated. . In fact, the OLF was annoyed at
the ELF and TPLF for having exploited its apparent cooperation in London
to get what they wanted, and then turn around to block its own call for
an “Oromia” state under its own hegemony. Having incarcerated or
dismissed without compensation several thousands of civilian and
military members of the defunct regime, the TPLF, with advice, consent
and, when necessary command of EPLF, then planted its own cadres and
cronies in all critical bureaucratic, media, security, financial,
judicial, clerical and diplomatic positions of its Ethiopia. There were
hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who had been natural and legal
residents in the Eritrean region of Ethiopia for many decades. But in
1991, the EPLF, with TPLF complicity, confiscated the homes, monies and
other properties of these Ethiopians, including of siblings of
“mixed” marriages (i.e. “Ethiopian” and “Eritrean”), and
summarily evicted them from EPLF-Eritrea. Unarmed rank and file
Ethiopians at home and abroad protested these gross violations of human
rights by EPLF at the time, but the TPLF regime made no representation
on behalf of the dispossessed and forcibly evicted Ethiopians.
Regrettably, much of the outside world, including governments, human
rights and humanitarian organizations, were also mute about such gross
victimization of Ethiopians. And
so, during the first seven years of its hegemony, the TPLF faithfully
followed the script worked out with EPLF during the 1970’s and
1980’s to divide, weaken, exploit, impoverish and, in the end,
dissolve Ethiopia. During these same years, EPLF was bloated militarily
without having to spend anything on armaments. The newly created small
state of EPLF-Eritrea was not only well armed with Ethiopian arsenals,
aircrafts, boats, tanks, ammunition, etc. This is also buttressed with
military/security agreements between the two regimes to the effect that
TPLF-Ethiopia will back up EPLF in the event of conflicts it involves
itself in. No one knows for sure yet what secret criminal covenants Mr.
Issayass and Mr. Meles might have concluded since the mid 1970’s with
regard to the politicide of Ethiopia, but recent events betray their
cabal is backfiring on them. The EPLF and TPLF have also reached
important strategic accords in 1991, and then signed a sweeping 25-item
protocol known as Asmara Pact in 1993. No word yet on the identity of
others that might have been privy to these deals besides EPLF’s
Issayass and TPLF’s Meles. These arrangements denote the strategic
unity of the two regimes--or in the very least, the two capobandas--on
the Horn. These pacts have not been made public or renounced by either
party, even after the 1998-2000 bloody war between them. (For some
inkling on this, cf. Tekeste N. and K. Tronvoll, Brothers At War,
2000). Thusly, since 1991,the TPLF and EPLF rendered the Ethiopian
people militarily demobilized and politically impotent and hence,
vulnerable to total domination and exploitation—at least until the end
of 1997. In
this scheme of things, EPLF, the senior culprit in the treachery, could
afford to exploit Ethiopia economically through its viceroys in Addis
Ababa and to flex its military muscles in the region as well. Thus, tiny
Eritrea, largely armed and financed by TPLF-Ethiopia, initiated armed
conflicts with Sudan, with Yemen, with Jibouti in the early 1990’s and
eventually (in 1998) with the very TPLF that nurtured and protected it
all along. There is a saying that thieves who collaborate on stealing
often end up being at loggerheads when it comes to dividing up the loot.
That in effect is what happened to TPLF and EPLF in 1998. Accomplished
thieves that they were EPLF and TPLF went about their mission of
exploiting Ethiopia for seven years until they were checked by their
individual greed. The ensuing tension on who gets what when and how
culminated in armed conflict along their border. All the while, TPLF was
declaring from the rooftops in 1991 that the Ethiopia under its (and
EPLF’s) rule was henceforth in a state of peace and had no need of a
national army, air force or any other military-security establishment.
Any group that wishes to entertain armed struggle to reclaim Eritrea can
try it on its own--the subliminal message was actually ‘TPLF will not
allow it to happen’--but that the TPLF would have no part in such a
“chauvenist” (euphemism for Ethiopian nationalists of Amhara
vintage) venture. From then on, swords were to be transformed into
ploughshares for “peaceful” development. OLF participants in the
July 1991 “Charter” Conference had also declared at the time that
“Oromo blood will never again be shed in Eritrea.” b)
Sowing political winds Having
grounded themselves firmly in Ethiopia-Eritrea in military terms, EPLF
and TPLF then turned their attention to political matters and modalities
of control. The first and more important business at hand as of May 1991
was securing the successful secession of EPLF-Eritrea and ensuring that
there will be no challenge to that illegitimate act from any quarters in
the rest of Ethiopia. The EPLF and TPLF had agreed on plans to actualize
their desideratum since mid 1970’s. Accordingly—and with gratuitous
facilitation and counseling by external elements and governments--they
prepared a draft which eventually surfaced in the July 1991 Conference
in Addis Ababa as a Transitional Period “Charter.” The main purpose
and mission of the Conference and the “Charter” was actually to
bestow a veil of legitimacy for Eritrea’s secession. To reinforce the
fiction of “legitimate” secession and to mollify--or better still
hoodwink--the international community, it was declared that the EPLF has
‘graciously’ decided to have a “referendum” on its own secession
in two years. The real purpose of this arrangement was to give time for caudillo
Issayass to rid his Eritrean turf of any possible internal challenges to
EPLF rule and to lay the foundations of economic growth with Ethiopian
subsidies, infrastructures, raw materials, food, foreign exchange and military materiel. Another was to create and assemble in short
order scores of groups, parties and cliques along ethnic-linguistic
lines as TPLF’s phony representatives of “self-determination” in
Ethiopia. The real motive of this
latter ploy by EPLF and TPLF has been to ensure that Ethiopians remain
divided and weakened in the short-run and to set in motion the process
of disintegration of the country, in the long run. The
participating “delegates” in the July 1991 Conference in Addis
Ababa, were self-delegated and/or designated by TPLF (with advice and
approval of EPLF behind the scenes), and not elected or even nominated
by constituents of the Ethiopian people. In one of his Freudian slip
moments of truth, TPLF’s Meles Zenawi, the chairman of that
Conference, blurted out the following a stark admission. He reminded the
participants that: “None
of us at this (July 1991)
Conference are here because of the democratic will of the people but, as
in the case of TPLF/EPRDF (and EPLF, he might have added),
because of our martial victory over the Derg, and in the case of some of
you, because of perceived support for the struggle.” So,
it was that kind of unelected, unmandated, unrecognized
and hence, unpopular gathering under EPLF and TPLF auspices, that
made momentous—indeed, fatal--political decisions affecting the lives
and destinies of millions of Ethiopians, the secession of part of the
country including its peoples, its seashores and its resources. At least
one of the participants--the not-so-late Professor Asrat Woldeyes--had
tried to remind the participants that the gathering was not authorized,
mandated or expected by the people of Ethiopia to make such critical
national decisions like sanctioning the severing of the country.
Ethiopiand were not even allowed by EPLF and TPLF to peacefully
demonstrate protesting the illegitimate and treasonous manner of
formalizing the secession of Eritrea. When
in April 1993, a group of students in Addis Ababa University tried to
peacefully demonstrate to express their opposition to the local and
international charade to “legitimize” Eritrean secession, with the
connivance of then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. TPLF goons shot
and killed several of those demonstrating unarmed students. Forty-two
capable Ethiopian University professors and lecturers in the prime of
their careers were then summarily dismissed from their jobs, because of
their expressed or assumed Ethiopian nationalist sentiments. One of the
forty-two was the renowned surgeon, Professor Asrat Weldeyes, who died
in May 1999 as a political prisoner, after nearly five years of
suffering from deliberate maltreatment. (See the interview Professor
Asrat gave in May 1998 to Wendy Belcher, published in Ethiopian
Review (April/June 1998); cf also my piece, “The Current
Ethiopia-Eritrea Crisis and Professor Asrat Woldeyes,” in the same
periodical (July/August 1998). Back in 1993, on the eve of the
“referendum in EPLF-Eritrea, Professor Asrat had issued the following
prophetic statement: “…The
referendum in Eritrea is not binding on the Ethiopian people. The
Ethiopian people have not been consulted… The whole thing is a big
tragi-comedy show, whose end and implications have not been fully
appreciated. The show has not ended; it has only begun. The consequences
are grave and far reaching.”
Another
prisoner of conscience still in TPLF gaol, despite worldwide appeal for
his release, is Dr. Taye Wolde Semayat, President of Ethiopian Teachers
Association. In accordance with their longstanding strategic aims, the
new EPLF/TPLF centurions in Ethiopia then moved quickly to redraw unilateraly
the internal territorial borders of Ethiopia (minus Eritrea) into
nine “ethnic” (euphemism for tribal) killils or
bantustans. TPLF’s own Tigrai region was expanded by annexation of
agriculturally productive territories of Gonder and Wello regions.
Furthermore, the predominantly Amhara inhabited Ethiopian regions of
Gonder and Gojjam that hitherto bordered the Sudan to the West, are now
bordering the “national states” of Tigrai and Benishangul. “Is
this done border the Sudan--just in case of guerrilla struggles by
Amharas?” Other ethnic divisions are Oromia, Amhara, Benishangul,
Gambela, Southern region, Afar and Somali plus a few more enclaves.
Interestingly, the map was first leaked to a foreign periodical, and
when some questions were raised about its provenance without any study
or popular deliberation, the regime reacted by saying that it was
drafted only for preliminary discussions and should not be taken as
official. Well, that very map of killil borders and
nomenclatures--very likely drawn very early on by the TPLF and EPLF
guerrilla movements--has remained in place to this day without any
deliberation or popular sanction by the Ethiopian people. This is not
the first time that occupation forces have redrawn the map of Ethiopia
and the Horn. The model or precedent that serves EPLF/TPLF in dividing
up Ethiopia seems to be that of Fascist Italy in the 1930’s. In his
essay “Pax Italica and Ethiopia’s Enemies, 1936-1940,” Dr Tekeste
Negash notes that “during the Graziani period, the Muslims and the
Galla were expected to cooperate with the Italians against the
‘ruthless Amhara oppressors’ …and “it was considered that the
fewer Amharas alive, the better.” He adds that “the policy of ethnic
partition was pursued in Harer and Galla Sidama. The Amhara in Harer
were asked to leave, selling their property either to the Muslims or to
the state.” (See his No Medicine for the Bite of a White
Snake…(1986). Therefore, anyone with intelligence and integrity
who has observed what has transpired in Ethiopia since May 1991 should
recognize that history has repeated itself, with minor variations, a
half century later in the new Pax EPLF/TPLF era.
Pursuant to their ultimate aim of making Ethiopians disarmed,
divided and vulnerable even as Tigray and Eritrea wax strong, secure,
and prosperous, the EPLF and TPLF culpritswent beyond cutting up the
country along ethnic lines. They also saw to it that one region, one
locality, even one neighborhood is isolated from another. Teachers,
students, merchants, civil servants and professionals who were in place
in various parts of the country were evicted at the whims of the rulers
and their local cronies to “their own” ethnic killils. This
policy has spawned extreme forms of ethnic cleansing in some areas. The
glaring exception to this policy was that it did not apply to Tigrayans
and Eritreans. The two ethnics roamed all over Ethiopia as they wished
and no one could ask them to go to their own killils like
everyone else, because they are the martial rulers. Furthermore, in the
case of TPLF, it has its Tigrayan cadres entrenched in every part of the
country to see to it that everything is under its firm control. At the
same time, Ethiopians from other parts of the country have no presence
or function in Tigray. And, needless to say, there was no Ethiopian
presence or involvement in EPLF-Eritrea even during the period 1991-1993
to represent Ethiopian interest in connection with the preparations for
the “referendum.” It
is interesting that there was so much hue and cry about Eritreans being
evicted from Addis Ababa to their new state of Eritrea in the wake of
the 1998 war, when the same forced traumatic displacement of millions of
Ethiopians, has been taking place over the past decade in TPLF-Ethiopia.
It is apropos to footnote here that especially after 1993, it was
becoming fashionable for some Eritreans to voluntarily exhume the
horizontal remains of their kith and kin in parts of Ethiopia--which
they now characterized as a “stinking country,” for reburial
in Eritrea--their new “Sing-a-poor,” as someone spoofed it. But they
protested vehemently when they were asked to leave the “stinking
country” upright. In formal state ministries or in local branches of
the regime, any TPLF Tigrayan flunkey planted somewhere in the
bureaucracy has more decision making power than the formal minister or
head of the establishment. Today, even in Addis Ababa and other
relatively cosmopolitan towns, Ethiopians are experiencing acute
tensions and frictions along ethnic lines in schools, work places and
other fora.
It is also in TPLF’s master plan to alienate town from country in Ethiopia. This is especially true of Addis Ababa vis-à-vis rural areas. These mechanics of alienation know that Addis Ababa is an international capital where multitudes of foreign diplomatic and other personnel reside or shuttle to and fro. Thus, all token gestures and media ploys are concentrated there for the consumption of foreign “observers.” In reality, much of what appear in Addis Ababa, for instance in print media--that are not the direct products of the TPLF tribal dictatorship--do not reach the rest of the country unless it be by illicit means. What is often lost on the casual observer is how countless journalists have been incarcerated or exiled over the years. In effect, by design or by accident, the “free press” slogan has served as bait to attract waves after waves of able, gifted and literate writers who are then hounded and done away with in perpetual cycles. The Ethiopian Human Rights Council, International Committee to Protect Journalists and numerous other global human rights organizations have repeatedly protested against the shoddy treatment of “free press” journalists in Ethiopia. Another windfall function of the “free press” has been as a new source of funds for the regime. Besides the ever increasing printing costs and spiraling taxes sustained by the non-governmental press, the TPLF exacts exorbitant cash fines from journalists (and others) for bogus charges of “infringement” of its “laws,” to replenish its coffers. Unlike the official mouthpieces of the regime, the “free press” does not even enjoy the public right to know as it is blocked from participating in formal press conferences by the Prime Minister or from going to war fronts to offer the public its own report. Though the Prime Minister himself said at one time that he does not even glance at the non-governmental press because he considers it unworthy, he never tires of telling outsiders to look at the number of “free press” newspapers in Addis Ababa to appreciate how much things have changed in TPLF-Ethiopia.
In addition to all these sinister operations, the TPLF has
refined the job of dividing the Ethiopian people to the point of
splitting ethnic groups from within. Accordingly, the TPLF has formed
political organizations that serve TPLF’s interests exclusively as
mechanisms for challenging, thwarting, dwarfing and ultimately
eliminating any independent homegrown political organizations in the killils
that try to resist its centralized control. It is through such surrogate
organizations that the TPLF macro manages its economic exploitation and
political domination of Ethiopia at large. These include components of
TPLF’s Trojan Horse known as EPRDF like the Oromo Peoples Democratic
Organization (OPDO), formed to counter the older Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), in the Oromo killil. In the Amhara killil, the
regime has its puppet grouping known as Amhara National Democratic
Movement (ANDM) opposite the organization called All-Amhara Peoples
Organization (AAPO) formed by the not-so-late Professor Asrat Woldeyes.
The TPLF has chiseled its own SEPDF (South Ethiopia Peoples Democratic
Front) to counter the resistant SEPDC (Southern Ethiopian Peoples
Democratic Coalition). The same pattern obtains among the Afar, Gurage,
Somali, etc. So, the TPLF has not only been sowing its political winds
of deliberately dividing up the
Ethiopian people along ethnic lines but also within ethnic units. On
the other hand, there are no such artificial divisions fomented within
Eritrea and Tigray. Nevertheless, a number of older Eritrean and
Tigrayan dissident factions or parties in opposition to the ruling EPLF
and TPLF still survive in the Diaspora, and a few more have also sprung
up there in recent years.
Let us wind up our bird’s eye view of TPLF/EPLF sowing
political winds in Ethiopia-Eritrea by considering the dimensions of
democracy and human rights. The most tortured word in the political
vocabulary in TPLF-Ethiopia during the past decade, and more recently in
EPLF-Eritrea in the post-1998 period, is democracy. It turns out that
none other than Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington--more
recently of The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (1996) fame--was at least one
of Mr. Meles Zenawi’s gurus on the theory of democracy. The pupil
tells his tutor in 1993 in Addis Ababa that he had read his 1991 work on
democratization in the late twentieth century, entitled The Third
Wave. Professor Huntington, has divined in that book that the
“Third Wave of Democratization began, implausibly and unwittingly, at
twenty-five minutes after midnight, Thursday, April 25, 1974, in Lisbon,
Portugal, when a radio station played the song ”Grandola
Vila Morena.” Interestingly enough, on the back cover of The
Third Wave, Zbigniew Brezezinski has written: “Though Huntington
would disclaim the distinction, it (the book) does stamp him as a
democratic Machiavelli.” This prescient characterization was born out
in Huntington’s consultation/ workshop stint in Ethiopia in 1993,
where he tailored a ‘dominant-party democracy fashion suit’ for Mr.
Meles Zenawi to don. Huntington explicated various scenarios and options
of democratization and then opined that a peasant-based
“dominant-party system” would have “several advantages for a
country such as Ethiopia.” Such a party “would be an extension of
the EPRDF with a solid base among the peasantry and some appeal to
elements within most of the major ethnic groups….” He added that
“its electoral strength and hence assured control of the government would provide the continuity desirable
for economic development and to attract foreign investment.”
Emphasis added. (See his Political Development in Ethiopia: A
Peasant-Based Dominant-Party Democracy? Report to USAID, 17 May,
1993.). It appears that Huntington’s ideas in 1993 seem to head
forward to the past of the 1960’s when his main concern was
“political order” rather than democratization per
se. In Democratization? Ethiopia (1991-1994) A Personal View
(1995), Tecola W. Hagos has written an incisive critique of both
Huntington’s paternalistic notions and Mr. Meles’s disastrous
experimentation with them in Ethiopia.
It appears that Mr. Meles and his select TPLF operatives
perceived the notions purveyed by Huntington as a confirmation of the
democratic centralism (now christened “dominant”) party system they
have been used to and has served them well all along. In fact, Mr.
Meles, Professor Huntington’s pupil, has even been one up on his
instructor by posing as an expert on democracy. Professor Marina Ottaway
notes in her Africa’s New Leaders…(1999), that according to
Mr. Meles, democracy is “the participation of the people at the
grassroots level” (and that) “this is not the democracy expected by
the United States …because that country lacks broad participation by
the people.” So, the guerrilla tyrant who rules Ethiopia by the gun
calls his regime a higher form of “democracy” than that of the
United States. In point of fact, all the outlandish propaganda or
protestation of TPLF cadres, foreign interlopers and apologists to the
contrary, TPLF-Ethiopia is not
democratic and TPLF had or has no intention to submit itself to govern
or be governed by democratic principles. In the early 1990’s, an
expatriate journalist was doing a man-on-the-street interview of
Russians about Yeltsin-style “democracy.” One of the interviewees
did not mince words when he said that what they had there was not
democracy but ‘shitocracy.’ One wonders what equivalent phrase would
be an appropriate characterization of the nature of TPLF rule in
Ethiopia today. Tecola Hagos did his part in his book to probe for an
apt nomenclature for the TPLF regime. He has come up with “Ye
elfegne (boardroom)
democracy” which he expounds as follows:
“The Amharic word ‘ye
elfegne’ conveys the idea of autocracy, rigidity and formality. It
also connects the present Ethiopian pretence of modernity, with
Ethiopia’s past and present feudalism and relentlessly oppressive
(stifling) social structure. Thus, according to the lexicon the current
government of Ethiopia may be characterized as a government of
‘boardroom democracy.’…Of course, such a system is familiar to
most of us by its pre-Cold War name of Stalinism or democratic
centralism.” It is only fair to point out that those who follow events
in Ethiopia-Eritrea by reading only materials written in non-Ethiopic
languages, such as in English, are likely to miss perhaps seventy to
eighty per cent of coverage. With that caveat, for more on
“democracy” in TPLF-Ethiopia, see also Theodore Vestal, Ethiopia:
A Post-Cold War State (1999); EHRCO, Democracy, Rule of Law And
Human Rights in Ethiopia: Rhetoric and Practice (1995); “Is
Ethiopia Democratic?” Journal of Democracy (October 1998). And,
over the years several commentaries have been written in Ethiopian
periodicals and websites on the subject.
Another
much maligned notion bandied about in TPLF-Ethiopia today is “human
rights.” The most appropriate
way to open and close discussion on “human rights” in TPLF-Ethiopia
would have been this: “What human rights in Ethiopia?”
But that would be unconventional to some and unorthodox to others. After
all, TPLF does secure human rights for its own partisan minority
(although some of them even deny that) and for a few crumb consuming
cronies from other ethnic groups. But, the vast majority of the unarmed
Ethiopian people, their lot in the past decade has been sustaining gross
violations of their human rights including repression, torture, “extra
judicial” killings, exile, incarceration, denial of their right to
land ownership, intimidation, injustice, deprivation, impoverishment,
angst, malign neglect, internecine conflicts and the like. For a long
time, the TPLF rebuffed any challenges to its abysmal “human
rights,” records by saying that it was better than the Derg. But, as
former US Congressman Harry Johnston, chairing a Congressional Hearing
on Ethiopia in July 1994 put it: “Politically
motivated detention of opponents, 0delays in bringing prisoners to
trial, harassment of journalists and editors, and interference in the
judicial process have risen in recent months. In fact, Ethiopia may have
the largest number of political prisoners in the Horn of Africa.
Although some people may choose to compare human rights conditions to
that of the Mengistu era, I strongly believe that the Transitional
Government should be judged on its own publicly stated commitment to
human rights.” It
is quite telling that today, in 2001--fully seven years after those
words were recorded--the people who would be the first to confirm the
verity of Mr. Johnston’s stark conclusion are none other than TPLF
dissident elites who are being subjected to at least some of their own
(TPLF) abuses of human rights visited for a decade on the Ethiopian
people. The
TPLF’s perennial divisive and repressive policy in Ethiopia also
extends to labor unions, professional associations as well. It has
disbanded the long-standing Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU)
and its leader, Mr. Dawi Ibrahim has barely escaped into exile. An even
worse fate has befallen the Ethiopian Teachers Association (ETA) with
120,000 members. The President of the Association, Dr Taye Weldesemayat
has been in jail under harsh conditions on, as usual, trumped up
charges. He has become recipient of numerous professional and honorary
citations and accolades while in TPLF prison. International teachers
associations and other human rights organizations have declared him a
prisoner of conscience and repeatedly called for his release. But, the
TPLF despots seem intent on seeing Dr Taye and many thousands of other
political prisoners die in jail--as happened to Professor Asrat Weldeyes.
TPLF gendarmes gunned down Dr Taye’s deputy, Mr. Assefa Maru, in cold
blood in Addis Ababa in May 1997. The Secretary-General of ETA, Mr.
Gemoraw Kassa, is also exiled. As usual, the TPLF just goes on creating
its own puppet organizations in place of the genuine ones. Since its
formation in October 1991 by Professor Mesfin Weldemariam, the Ethiopian
Human Rights Council has issued more than fifty Regular and Special
Reports on the Human Rights situation in TPLF-Ethiopia. For anyone
seriously interested in pursuing the matter, can peruse the following
reports (and including the one cited earlier). Cf. also U.S.
Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices,
Ethiopia (2000), released Feb.2001; Julie Mayfield, “The Prosecution
of War Crimes and Respect for Human Rights: Ethiopia’s Balancing
Act” Emory International Law Review, Fall 1995. One can also
scan the pages of reports by Amnesty International and other
Human Rights agencies.
c)
Sowing Economic Winds The
Ethiopian Economic Association’s 1999/2000 publication, Annual
Report on the Ethiopian Economy (Vol. I) edited by Drs. Befekadu
Degefe and Berhanu Nega, opens the 429-page volume with this stark
statement: Ranked
at 210th out of a total of 210 countries in GNP per capita
terms and 208th in terms of per capita measured at Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) by the most recent World Bank, World Development
Report, Ethiopia is, by any measure, one of the poorest countries in the
world. This standing of the country among the community of nations is
confirmed by the Human Development Report of the UNDP, which locates it
at 172nd out of 174 countries. TPLF
claims and disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding, this is the
evident reality of TPLF-Ethiopia today. The only thing to quibble about
the above citation is whether the international graders and classifiers
should characterize Ethiopia as the “poorest” or as the “most
impoverished” country, the distinction of which is more than semantic.
Ethiopia is a rich country in people and resources, but it has been
impoverished deliberately by EPLF and TPLF in the past decade, as we
shall see below. The question that jumps out is: “How did this happen
after ten years of “peace,” “democracy” and “development”
under the total control of TPLF (and for most of this period, of EPLF as
well)?”
Although
for the most part, the international community either did not seek them
out or ignored them as being products of partisan or disgruntled Amhara
“chauvinists” opposed to the EPLF/TPLF hegemony in Ethiopia-Eritrea,
numerous writers, both from the southern and the northern sides of the
Mereb river, have been writing all along in Ethiopic and extra-Ethiopic
languages, on the lopsided ‘elephantitis’ economic pattern in the
country. Just as in the martial and the political realms, as we saw in
preceding pages, the EPLF and TPLF also sowed economic winds in
Ethiopia-Eritrea. With martial might to assert, charter,
consitutionalize and impose their will and agenda in Ethiopia-Eritrea,
EPLF and TPLF launched processes and institutions of economic
exploitation in Ethiopia. One of the first writers to cry out in the
wilderness was Dr Assefa Negash. After coming out with articles on the
systematic looting and plundering of Ethiopia between 1991 and 1995 by
EPLF at first, followed quickly by TPLF. He published The Pillage of
Ethiopia by Eritreans and their Tigrean Surrogates in 1996, in which
he meticulously documented the variety of ways by which EPLF and TPLF
systematically dismantled developmental structures and hauled resources,
machinery and other assets from the rest of Ethiopia to Eritrea and
Tigray. He also narrates how thousands of Ethiopians were dismissed from
their workplaces and then replaced by Eritreans and Tigrayans during
this period to facilitate wholesale plundering of Ethiopia. Many
Ethiopian papers and periodicals have been reporting the same phenomena.
As we
scan the patterns of sowing economic winds in Ethiopia by EPLF and TPLF,
the reader needs to understand that especially until 1993, EPLF-Eritrea
which was “independent” politically but fully dependent on
Ethiopia economically. So, with TPLF sanction and protection EPLF
figuratively and literally sapped Ethiopia dry to build industrial
infrastructures for Eritrea. Even financial outlays that were earmarked
for Ethiopia were siphoned to Eritrea. The Eritreans trucked food items,
agricultural products, lumber, coffee and anything they wanted at will
and without regard to shortages in Ethiopia. To the extent that they had
to pay for some of these goods, money was no problem. They had
confiscated banks, businesses and all sources of money when they entered
Asmera in 1991. And then, the TPLF regime officially subsidized EPLF. In
Eritrea and abroad, the EPLF was also openly engaged in illicit
Ethiopian ‘Birr’ to US Dollar exchanges as another source of
amassing birr or dollar currencies. In addition to all of the above, the
adept EPLF-Eritrean mafia–like crooks also printed counterfeit money
which they often dumped on unsuspecting trusting Ethiopian farmers or
merchants. Some of the items they absconded from Ethiopia like (coffee,
for instance) were re-exported to get hard currency at Ethiopia’s
expense, with TPLF looking on. EPLF and TPLF pilfered Ethiopian money
and resources and then recycled the same to “create” Eritrean and
Tigrayan wealth at the expense of all other Ethiopians. As
if all that was not enough, EPLF-Eritreans “borrowed” millions of
dollars from Ethiopian banks to buy goods outside either for their own
direct consumption within Eritrea or to carry on illicit trade by
selling these items in Ethiopia thereby undercutting local businessmen.
EPLF-Eritreans very often paid little or no taxes and they were exempt
from tariffs during these early years. It is by sapping Ethiopia in
these and many other ways that EPLF-Eritreans became “legitimate”
entrepreneurs and amassed untold “Eritrean” wealth. For the most
part, they recycled fraudulently obtained Ethiopian money to build
mansions and businesses in Ethiopia-Eritrea. Before 1991 items that
originated from the Eritrean region to the rest of Ethiopia were
spaghetti, salt, safety matches, some beer and shoes that were not
significant in the overall economic picture in monetary terms. But,
according to the World Bank, United States Embassy reports from Asmera
and other media reports, by 1996, EPLF-Eritrea’s “exports” of
mostly manufactured goods to Ethiopia amounted to some 70% of its total
trade, while its imports from Ethiopia was less than 6% of its overall
exports. So, clearly EPLF-Eritrea’s vision of becoming the new
industrial African Singapore or Taiwan was premised on Ethiopia being
its perpetual unfailing provider of raw materials, markets and transient
labor to build its industrial power. Apparently, EPLF had no anxiety or
doubt that this process would be jeopardized as long as its surrogate
TPLF ruler (s) were ensconced in Addis Ababa. Many of the monetary and
business requirements and obligations that applied to average Ethiopians
or even to other foreign businessmen did not apply to them. Besides all
these ways of exploiting and pillaging Ethiopia, the EPLF also used the
Asseb port and the oil refinery there as additional sources to gouge
Ethiopia of more of its foreign exchange earnings. They demanded and got
exorbitant fees in hard currency for Ethiopia’s use of the port. And
then the notorious servile TPLF regime even agreed to have Ethiopian
Airlines to transit land in Asmera even when its flight routes did
not call for it. The reason was to pay EPLF-Eritrea hundreds of
thousands of dollars as landing fees daily. Much of this was going on
right through 1997, when EPLF-Eritrea issued a new currency called nakfa
in place of Ethiopian birr. (For more on these matters see also, for
instance, Sebhatu Woldeyes, “Eritrea… how long should it be carried
on Ethiopia’s back?” in Amharic in Tobia, October 1997;
Mankelkelot Haile Selassie “Yes,
Ethiopia is a Colony of Eritrea,” Moresh September, 1986.) One
recalls how agitated EPLF-Eritreans and their sycophants were over the
eviction of Eritreans from Ethiopia after the 1998 debacle, which
exposed both EPLF and TPLF. One of the issues concerned the charge that
millions of dollars and properties were confiscated from Eritreans by
TPLF and that they will sue to recover the same. Well, TPLF can answer
for itself on the issue of the modality of the evictions. The Commission
which has been set up to look into claims of liabilities will have to go
into what has just been outlined above. In addition to that, Ethiopians
will have to demand compensation for decades of industrial, educational,
defense and other expenses in Eritrea and on Eritreans by Ethiopia for
at least fifty years since the 1950’s. Any just assessment of claims
by EPLF-Eritrea has to take into account the un-recovered investments of
Ethiopia on Eritreans and the untold millions of dollars illegally
acquired by EPLF-Eritrea with the connivance of TPLF from 1991 to 1998.
As we move now to the other (TPLF) dimension of brazen plunder, it is
instructive to cite a passage here from Brothers at War, on the
premises and expectations of unabated exploitation of Ethiopia by EPLF.
In their discussion of Economic Relations in Ethiopia-Eritrea in the
context of the still secret series of 25 protocols signed between EPLF
and TPLF in Asmera, the authors refer to “minutes of joint ministerial
commission meetings” (between 1993 and 1997). “…The Eritrean
government did not shy away from expressing their position, as well as
their vision of the nature of economic relations. They rejected outright
the Ethiopian trade proposal on hard currency and warned the Ethiopian
government that such arrangement would not work. …. One can argue
indeed that when the Ethiopian government proceeded to implement its new
trade policy, the Eritrean government considered this to be a
declaration of war.” It is difficult to underestimate or forget the
level and intensity of EPLF-Eritrean plunder of Ethiopia from 1991 to
1998. It is even more incredible that a regime sitting in Addis Ababa
made all that possible by working more for another state than for the
one it was supposed to represent. EPLF could not have done
more or better on its own behalf if warlord Issayass had run matters
himself directly from Addis Ababa instead of from Asmera. We know about
officials or other individuals within a state committing or being
accused of treason such as spying for some foreign government for
monetary or ideological reasons. But until 1991, history has not
recorded a case in which a whole regime (TPLF) that rules in one country
doing everything possible to benefit another state (Eritrea) at the
absolute detriment of the state (Ethiopia) it rules. EPLF’s
impoverishment of Ethiopia is but half the story. It did not take very
long for the TPLF to apprentice in the techniques of pillaging Ethiopia.
There was enough wealth in the country for both EPLF and TPLF to
plunder. In fact, the TPLF disciples quickly outpaced their EPLF gurus
in building their Tigray “national state” Their monopoly of arms and
more direct political control of the country was a decided advantage.
Their early vehicle of economic activity was TDA (Tigray Development
Association) established in Washington, D.C. in 1989, patterned after
EPLF’s ERA (Eritrean Relief Association). These were cast as
humanitarian NGOs for tax exemption purposes abroad. After 1991, EPLF
transformed its ERA into a business enterprise called Red Sea
Corporation under the direct control of EPLF/PFD--in reality under
President Issayass himself. The TPLF still kept its TDA as an exclusive
channel for funds into Tigray from the Diaspora, and it was quietly
casting a well-crafted net of exploitation in Ethiopia. Even as it was
issuing an edict (1994) to the effect that “a political party, which
has attained legal personality, may not directly or indirectly engage in
commercial and industrial activity,” the TPLF had already launched its
conglomerate in its Ethiopia. TPLF had created scores of businesses
quietly since the early 1990’s, whose “shares” it “sold” to
more than 50 trusted TPLF cadres, who in effect, “fronted” for the
party as “private entrepreneurs.” Its next move (1995) was to create
TPLF’s own version of Red Sea Corporation, called EFFORT (Endowment
Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray). As of 1996, the TPLF had all those
fronting ‘philanthropist’ to “donate” the shares to the
Endowment (EFFORT). This way, the TPLF could say that it did not
contravene its own “laws” strictly applied to others. As incredible
as it may be to fathom, EFFORT--TPLF’s colossal business empire--is
registered not as a business conglomerate but as a “humanitarian”
NGO exempt from taxation or public accountability. Accordingly, the TPLF
operatives who now run EFFORT’s business empire are supposed to be
merely custodians of a self-help ‘endowment’ or foundation.
Furthermore, while the tentacles of its exploitation reach out all over
TPLF-Ethiopia inhabited by nearly 60 million people, the assets and
benefits obtained accrue to the rehabilitation of only one region called
Tigray with a population of less than 4 millions. What makes this all
the more astounding is when one keeps in focus the fact that TPLF is the
party that rules not just Tigray “national state” but the country as
a whole--minus Eritrea. By
1996, the TPLF not only caught up but also actually surpassed the EPLF
in structuring and managing the business of pillaging and fleecing
Ethiopia for tribal gain. The Board of Directors of EFFORT, chaired by
Mr. Seye Abraha (currently detained under charges of corruption), had
five major branches, headed by top lieutenants of TPLF. These were
Industry (Abadi Zemo), Mining (Tedros Hagos), Finance and Trade (Sebhat
Nega), Construction and Transport (Arkebe Equbay) and Agriculture
(Tsegaye Taemyallew). It then organized the numerous businesses set up
earlier by TPLF under the above categories. Other trusted cadres were
also placed in managerial positions and in branch boards. Accordingly, a
glance at twenty high profile TPLF businesses within the EFFORT umbrella
shows how party hierarchy and business management and control are
intertwined. Businesses so established include Wegagen Bank, Almeda
Textile Management, Mesfin Engineering, Africa Insurance, Sur
Construction, Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization, Selam Bus Line, Addis
Pharmaceutical, Mega Media, Dilet Brewery, Dedebit Credit and Savings
with capital outlays amounting from as high as $180 million birr
(Almeida Textiles) to as low as $1 million birr (Selam Bus Line)
headquartered in Mekele or in Addis Ababa. The total paid-up capital is
said to be over a billion birr at the time of its being set up. The
controlling shareholder of these countrywide businesses with a minimum
of 51% of the shares is EFFORT. In fact, in the view of Amha Yilma
commenting in the Amharic edition of the Reporter, Sep. 1993
(Eth. Cal.), the rate and ferocity with which TPLF businesses were
fanning out in TPLF-Ethiopia gobbling up or trampling over small-scale
private businesses: “Unless
we are limited by our finite knowledge about everything that goes on in
the country, perhaps the only area the (TPLF) business may not has gone
into, is the level of to selling green and ground red pepper, split and
ground peas…at roadsides…” The
TPLF cadre controlled boards of these businesses as well as their
managements are interlocked. (For details on the subject see the 1997
report, Ethiopian Non-Governmental Business: Companies Controlled by
or Associated with EPRDF (read TPLF since EPRDF is only an alias
at best) member Organizations, Addis Ababa; Cf. also Awualom Aynekulu
“The Emerging Monopolies of the TPLF,” Ethiopian Register,
July 1996. In
1999, TDA celebrated 10 years of development in Tigray under its aegis.
It issued a very colorful anniversary tabloid to commemorate the
occasion of its successes in “implementing 1176 projects in 806
villages benefiting 1.7 million people. One of those who presided on the
occasion was none other than Mr. Gebru Asrat, TPLF’s President of the
National State of Tigray since 1991 who lauded TDA’s contribution that
made “a tremendous impact in our region.” In his glory days, Mr.
Gebru Asrat at times spoke of the two neighboring states of “Tigray
and Ethiopia.” Two years after such pomp and ceremony in his
“National State,” Mr. Gebru has been stripped from his Presidency
and dismissed from the TPLF hierarchy. So, ostensibly, TDA still manages
monies transferred from Diaspora Tigrayans while EFFORT sucks dry the
Ethiopian cow at home to develop one unit of the “federation.” For
Ethiopians who have been deafened for decades by the big EPLF Lie of
Eritrea being “colonized” by Ethiopia to justify their secessionist
struggle, we have now another round of lies emanating in TPLF-Tigray.
What is sad, however, is not the lie itself but from whom it comes. In
the TDA tabloid mentioned above, the new Big Lie comes out of the mouth
of Dr Solomon Inquai, an Ethiopian educator, long-time Extension program
administrator at Addis Ababa University and well-known among his peers.
He says, in part, the following: “Successive rulers from Menelik to
Mengistu made it their mission to see that the area (Tigray) did not
progress. In fact, negative measures such as the closing of schools and
trying to forcefully resettle people elsewhere, were instituted to
ensure a lack of development. Even though Tigrai was visited by frequent
droughts, no steps to combat their effects were taken.” So, once this
premise is adopted what follows is not hard to figure out. We have
scanned it in foregoing pages. It is an amalgam of self-righteousness,
sense of vengeance, missionary zeal, military ruthlessness and blind
injustice, all of which have characterize TPLF behavior towards
Ethiopians under its carabignieri boots.
We wind up our discussion of EPLF-TPLF sowing economic winds in
Ethiopia-Eritrea with a few points on party/regime symbiosis in TPLF
rule in Ethiopia. The fundamental point is that there is no distinction
in TPLF-Ethiopia or, for that matter in EPLF-Eritrea today, between
party (TPLF) and state (FDRE) in political and economic matters.
The TPLF controls everything by force and fraud. Key positions and
even low-level functions are handled by Tigrayans or manageable and
disposable others. Administrators, managers, security personnel, customs
officials, bankers, accountants, “judges” mass organization bosses,
ecclesiastical persons, merchants, brokers, contractors, inspectors,
peasant handlers and so on are virtually all Tigrayans (and until
recently, Eritreans also). Nothing and no one so far has restrained,
slowed or stopped EPLF-TPLF plunder and exploitation of
Ethiopia—thanks to its monopoly of arms. What the TPLF cannot control,
like Addis Ababa University, ETA, Trade Unions etc., it destroys. What
is comical about current discussions of corruption in certain quarters
is: “Why not, who are they afraid of, and who do they have to account
for?” And, “how come a few of them have been named so late in the
day?” These few sacrificial lambs may have been caught with their
fingers in small jars. But, “Who is going to catch the big boys at the
summit who have been committing political and economic corruption on the
Ethiopian people for the last ten years.” By depriving Ethiopians of
their natural right to own and dispose of their land, the TPLF coerces
peasants in rural areas to toe the line in support of the regime, on
pain of losing part or all of the land they may be using to eke out
subsistence. There are also other forms of manipulation and control
involving fertilizers, loans, seeds, machinery etc… it can give or
deny peasants depending on their manifest loyalty to the regime as
attested by loyal cronies in the regions. As Awualom Aynekulu pointed
out, “Diversifying
the forms of its plunder, the TPLF/EPRDF now deploys its cadres to
collect money from farmers, civil servants and the business community in
the name of ‘voluntary’ contributions...The TPLF has created an
atmosphere of fear and insecurity that has destroyed the people’s
confidence in the law and that has made the people vulnerable to
manipulation and exploitation by TPLF-organized political thugs.”. In
urban areas, especially in Addis Ababa the TPLF has shown that it can do
things more cleverly. Cognizant of the presence of a large number of
foreigners, it sees to it that the comfort of foreigners is attended to
in terms of availability of consumer items and basic amenities and
services, which net the TPLF considerable hard currency. It appears that
many foreigners can and do go about their business in Addis Ababa in the
midst of appalling poverty among the people as long as there are roads
to drive on and there is caviar and entertainment in the Sheraton and,
of course, their own security is intact. The TPLF also carefully lets a
few entrepreneurs from abroad to run around, to bid for this or for that
business attracted by TPLF propaganda about “free enterprise.” More
often than not, however, most aspiring entrepreneurs return penniless to
where they came from. (For more on the economy, see also Ejigou Demissie
(Amharic) “TPLF Administration and the State of Ethiopia’s
Economy” in two parts, Ethiopian Register, Aug./Sep. 1996). It
is telling to read the newly launched Addis Ababa Fortune
magazine online on ww.Ethioguide.com, which tracks such ventures
and their blues. Perusing the pages of the publication periodically
reminds one of how Rehabenna Tegab (roughly translated as affluence and destitution)
still coexist in Ethiopia. The EPLF-TPLF mission of scraping Ethiopia to
the bone continues unabated. To undercut small businessmen in Ethiopia
who try to produce consumer items such as flour, vegetable oil, soap,
etc, the TPLF through its EFFORT imports such items and floods the
market. In so doing they are intentionally impoverishing the people, who
could have found some employment with these local businesses. When two
businessmen (one Tigrean or one who gives a hefty bribe on the one hand,
and one not) purchase the same items, the former can get it past customs
for little or no duty so that he can sell it for cheaper and undercut
the business of the non-Tigrayan or non-favored one by the regime--such
as not being within the purview of EFFORT. If all else fails, there is
the proverbial corruption joker in the business world known as the
BRIBE, which comes into play readily. Such acts are perpetrated against
Ethiopians. We started out this section of “sowing economic winds with
a citation about Ethiopia being “by
any measure, Ethiopia is the poorest nation on earth… Is
there any wonder why Ethiopia is the most impoverished country in the
world in 2000/2001! It is hoped that reading of the whole article sheds
light as to why, tragically, this is so. Ethiopia has been deliberately
plundered and impoverished by EPLF and TPLF. Even after the lull
following their internecine conflict in 1998, the situation has not
fundamentally changed. To be sure, autocrat Meles Zenawi and his TPLF
henchmen know exactly what they have been doing during their colonizing
tenure –from 1991 to the present--in Ethiopia. Speaking at Harvard
University (5 September 2000) autocrat Meles spoke of how African
economies are characterized as zero-sum game “rent-seeking
economies…” He ought to know what he is talking about. He and his
TPLF have been the architects of “rent-seeking economy” in Ethiopia,
rendering everything in the country subject to lease, rent or
confiscation. Obviously, the
resultant zero-sum game of this is that Ethiopians have been losing
everything and EPLF/TPLF have been gaining everything.
The peoples of Ethiopia-Eritrea and EPLF/TPLF reap the whirlwind: 1998-
Let
me add a word about “reaping the whirlwind.” It is essential for all
concerned to recognize that the acts of ‘sowing
the wind’ and of
‘reaping the whirlwind’ in
Ethiopia-Eritrea are ongoing processes. In temporal terms, the whirlwind
phenomena can be marked as of 1998 when war was spawned involving not
only EPLF and TPLF, but also hundreds of thousands of people in
Ethiopia-Eritrea. It has not yet been possible to stop the
wind-whirlwind cycle. But it has to be pointed out that while it has been EPLF and TPLF that
have been sowing, as we have seen, their martial, political and economic
winds in Ethiopia-Eritrea since 1991, it is both them and the peoples of
Ethiopia-Eritrea who are reaping the whirlwind. The whirlwinds
sustained by the peoples at large in the past ten years have been
described and are being described by many honest observers and competent
commentators at home and abroad. What has been in the pages of this
article is a modest reflection of that. However, what is new since 1998
is that, for the first time, the ruling parties in Ethiopia-Eritrea
namely, TPLF/EPRDF and EPLF/PFDJ,
have begun to reap what they have been sowing all
along. What is interesting here, as mentioned earlier, is how the
same fallout is being witnessed in both regions--and the beat goes on! Consider
the following samples of events of the last two years: Full
scale war between the two and indecisive cessation and
“peace” deal Dissension
in the higher ranks of the ruling parties, Evictions
of nationals from both sides of the Mereb Killing
or jailing students and closing universities Intensive
opposition to the two warlords (Issayass and Meles); Defections and
denunciations by erstwhile loyalists Revelations
of corruption in high places Continuing
detention of dissidents and opponents Banning
publications and activities Each
side training and sponsoring opposition elements against the other side Both
Issayass and Meles have been declared dictators by their own bosom
comrades The
list can expand and more is added everyday, but the foregoing 11
examples should suffice to illustrate the point. The two dictators are
being whipped by the whirlwinds of their own making. As they say in
English, ‘the chickens have come home to roost” (or whatever
chickens like to do) on their heads. The question that remains is:
“Are the peoples of Ethiopia-Eritrea ready to take back to restore
their rights in a civil and democratic way and ensure that this time,
history does not again repeat itself in ways all too vivid in the
region’s recent past?” On
the TPLF-Ethiopia side of the equation, people have been somewhat worked
up over a couple of recent developments. One of these is the dissension
among the top echelons of TPLF in March-April of this year. The
impression or illusion among some has been that one side (the
dissidents) was more “nationalist” vis-à-vis EPLF than the other
”palace” side, as it were. My own comment is, looking at this or any
other conundrum as Ethiopians, we should not confuse the wax for the gold, and we should not be distracted by decoy signs
on the roadsides. Perhaps, one side may sound more ‘nationalistic’
than the other side, but the collective chauvinist nationalism of both
sides is Tigray uber alles, and
not Ethiopian patriotism. The
supporters or opponents of one side or the other are more concerned
about the repercussions of the division on continued Tigrayan hegemony
in their Ethiopia, than about the current or ultimate threat from the
Tigray-Tigrign north of the Mereb. At the very least, TPLF collective
behavior from 1991 to 2001 validates this proposition. On the other
hand, it may very well be that the TPLF dissidents might have gotten
wind of incriminating corruption evidence against them, and they might
have thought they could quash it by an MLLT (Marxist-Leninist League of
Tigray) cadre coup against Meles. But it backfired on them. One
should not lose sight of the fact that up until the recent split, all of
them--MLLT Bolsheviks and Mensheviks--designed and executed all the
policies of TPLF since 1991, including the secession of Eritrea and
subsequent financial and other support, and altogether they prosecuted
not one but several battles on the Eritrean-Tigrean fronts. None of them
said anything publicly in opposition to the 12/12/00 sham
“peace” deal in Algiers at the time with all that that implied after
the loss of more than 100,000 Ethiopian lives. Instead, they all
celebrated their “victory”--whatever was meant by that. One cannot
redeem in camera party meeting
records of division of opinion on this or that issue and decide
retroactively that so and so tried to do something good or bad. They all
know very well that their party operates on the dictates of democratic
centralism in which the losing side in voting is subordinate to the
majority. So, on this score as far as Ethiopians are concerned it is the
old case of not wanting to choose “a prettier one among monkeys.” Another
development has to do with corruption scandals and incarcerations. A
question that jumps out is: “How come corruption became an issue only
a few months ago, when it has been going on for nearly a decade up and
down the ladder of TPLF rule in its Ethiopia?” The answer, it seems to
me points to the direction of a not unanticipated struggle for the helm
of power that must have been simmering underneath for some time. War or
battle always changes the chemistry of relations in ways that are not
always predictable. Perhaps some among the dissidents might have felt
that a decade was long enough for Mr. Meles to continue as the top dog
of TPLF in Addis Ababa. They too are young and deserving to have a shot
at being a caudillo in this land of 13 months of sunshine, milk and
honey called Ethiopia. It appears that this scenario was not lost on Mr.
Meles and, to say the least, he was not amused. Like all dictators, he
keeps tab on everybody around him through his informants. Since
ultimately the corruption buck stops at his doorstep, he could and
should have checked the endemic and rampant corruption up and down the
aisles of his TPLF/EFFORT regime and all the way to his own domestic
quarters long ago. But now in March 2001, Sene
and Segno (the rough Ethiopian version of Friday the 13th )
presented itself, and he made his preemptive stike or palace
counter-coup on the aspiring but hapless claimants to his power by
pulling out the corruption tag from his bag. One
positive result from this internecine infighting within TPLF is actually
hearing some of the prisoners—especially Mr. Seye Abraha—saying out
loud how unjust and intolerable the TPLF “juridical” and prison
systems are, etc., and that they are neither corrupt nor criminals but
political prisoners. Did they hear when the martyr, Professor Asrat
Woldeyes was saying that for five years and died, and that’s what is
happening to Dr Taye Weldesmayat and thousands of others. “Would
anyone have imagined this to happen to the likes of those TPLF bulwarks
who did so much to put Mr. Meles in power, to secure Eritrean secession
and then to wage wars with the same EPLF they helped, would end up this
way?” Ethiopians tend to call such phenomena as ‘God’s just
desert’ for them, and in the English speaking world they call it
something like ‘poetic justice.’ Another ember of light that may
generate a degree of hope is that lately, some Tigrayans in the
Diaspora--and no doubt a lot more in Tigray itself had they not been
muzzled—are showing tentative signs of coming out of the closet of
Tigrayan chauvinism, so to say, and reassert their Ethiopianity and
bonding with their fellow Ethiopians at large. Recently, there have been
reports that in certain localities Tigrayans refused to conduct meetings
in Tigrigna vernacular with TPLF troubleshooters from Mekele or Addis by
themselves in Tigrigna, but with other fellow Ethiopians and in a
language they can all understand. Elsewhere, Ethiopian alternative
groups, such as the Ethiopian
Democratic Party (EDP), are propounding programs of national
reconciliation. It remains to be seen if it gains momentum to the point
where the haughty, snobbish and tribalist TPLF naftegna
regime in Addis Ababa responds positively, for a change.
OPEN
LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER/PRESIDENT MELES By
way of winding down this article on a yet inconclusive subject, an Open
Letter is hereby attached that, at least in part, represents the views
of a number of Ethiopians. The Letter consists of a series of questions
pertaining to certain simple but vital issues. The questions are
addressed to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, TPLF’s
“revolutionary democratic” ruler in Addis Ababa. 01
--When was the last or the first time in the past ten years that
you, as the President and then Prime Minister in Ethiopia visited
different parts of your “Federation?” Which region(s) of your
“federal” empire did you actually visit in the last ten years?
Don’t you yearn to see, touch and talk to your subjects in person?
Don’t you take some fresh air every now and then in your sprawling
colony? Mr. Prime Minister/President, aside from video or audio cameo
appearances, you are virtually as invisible live in TPLF-Ethiopia as
Sheikh Omar of the Taliban is in Afghanistan. 02-- When was the last or the first time you were seen mingling among your colonial subjects with all your praetorian guards or seen live in public functions and ceremonies like graduations, in different parts of the Ethiopia that you rule? Are you afraid of the Ethiopian people or is it a question of them being people of the “rag” (as you referred to the Ethiopian flag once) unworthy of your personal attention? 03--
When was the last or the first time you spontaneously showed up
somewhere at a school, visited the sick or ventured to a farm in the killils
of FDRE other than in Tigray national state? Compare these matters with
the frequency of your visits and public functions in Mekele and Asmera,
the land of people of “gold” (your description of Tigrayans/Eritreans). 04-- Why is it that every time you go to and from Addis Ababa airport, everything in your path is virtually frozen, no other vehicles move and people face the walls with your TPLF guards aiming their guns at and menacing everyone that happens to be there? Are you not popular in Addis Ababa and the rest of Ethiopia or, are you acknowledging that your regime is an occupation force in Ethiopia? 05-- Why is it that every time you come to the United States, you are met with increasing hostility by Ethiopians—including some Tigreans in the Diaspora at the moment--thanks to the whirlwinds spawned by the internal struggle for power within TPLF?” 06-- Why is it that, of all people, you as the Prime Minister in Ethiopia, have expended so much of your energy, “prestige” and “reputation” to be the spokesperson for EPLF-Eritrea’s rights and privileges, its occupation of Ethiopia’s people and land in Asseb more than EPLF’s Issayass himself did? 07--
Inasmuch as your guerrilla movement mushroomed in the crucible of the
Ethiopian student movement with the clarion call of “Land To The
Tiller” which ushered the Revolution in 1974, why is it that when you
perched in Addis Ababa, you proscribed ownership of their own land by
the Ethiopian people? You have been quoted as saying, “nobody has
manufactured land;” ergo, nobody
is entitled to it. Neither did the TPLF manufacture Ethiopian land from
which it exacts exorbitant tithes and fees to finance its diabolical
operations against the very dispossessed Ethiopian people. Why, Mr.
Prime Minister? 08-- After presiding over Ethiopian casualties of over 100,000 in the border war between TPLF and EPLF along the Tigrayan border since 1998, what was achieved for Ethiopia that impelled you to eagerly sign the 12/12/00 Algiers deal with President Issayass? Do you concern yourself about the judgment of history aquatting on a historic land? Or, are you a true believer in your patron, Issayass Afewerki who said in 1991: “Forget history; man makes history and we have made an independent Eritrea.” Is that what you emulate? 09--
Why has TPLF under your watch systematically targeted Ethiopian
educational institutions, especially Addis Ababa University for
demonization and destruction? Your regime has been repeatedly killing,
maiming, incarcerating, torturing or exiling patriotic Ethiopian
students, teachers, union leaders, monks, journalists
and thousands of rank and file Ethiopians, dismissing competent
Ethiopian academics, dismantling bona fide Teachers Associations and decimating their elected leaders
or jailing them, denuding the universities in Ethiopia of their
resources and assets and, for all intents and purposes, closing them
down? 10--Why
is it that the TPLF has become the biggest commercial enterprise with
the instrumentality of its EFFORT network which controls much of the
economy of Ethiopia. As a political party of only one region, TPLF has
more financial assets and liquidity than the entire “federal”
establishment. How come? Don’t you have “laws” against parties
being in business in the books? Or, don’t those “laws” apply to
TPLF and its crumbs-worthy clones in EPRDF? 11—How
is it that in the last ten years of your tenure as ruler of Ethiopia,
the Ethiopian economic base has been good enough to produce a handful of
millionaires (mostly Tigrayans/Eritreans) who excel in excess and
opulence while the vast majority of Ethiopians are impoverished? By any
international standards, Ethiopia is today at the very bottom rung as
one of the poorest countries in the world. One would not get that from
reading materials issued by the TPLF regime. More and more people become
beggars, children become homeless and women become prostitutes at
alarming rates in Ethiopia. Whose vision is all this, Mr. Prime
Minister? 12—Granted
the TPLF came to power in Ethiopia in 1991 by killing and dying along
the way. You have rounded up and jailed thousands of people for ten
years now to insure the security of the regime and to charge them with
political crimes. While most of these people are still in jail your
goons keep killing, maiming, jailing or forcing into exile thousands and
thousands of people including students. Your mighty naeftegna
regime has arrogated to itself the “right” to administer
“justice” to others while its hands are drenched with fresh blood
everyday. And who will administer justice to your regime, Mr. Prime
Minister? 13--
Given all the talk of rampant corruption in TPLF-Ethiopia today and
token indictments of sacrificial lambs, where does and should the buck
stop regarding economic and political corruption in your regime when all
is said and done, Mr. Prime Minister? 14--
Why is it that fires are being stoked and tensions are increasing in
TPLF-Ethiopia’s relations with neighboring countries? Relations have
deteriorated with (whatever is left of) Somalia, strained with Jibouti,
cold with Kenya, unpredictable day-to-day syndrome with Sudan, and the
mother of it all, a two-year bloody war with EPLF-Eritrea--TPLF’s own Frankenstein? 15--
You have said repeatedly that you do not want Asseb as Ethiopia’s
natural port and Djibouti is no longer as amenable as before. Your
regime is taking steps to rent port facilities in Port Sudan--more than
twice farther for Addis Ababa or even for Mekele (your favorite capital)
than was Asseb or Djibouti, for that matter? This choice by your regime
or even its consideration reminds one of the dimwit who puts his right
foot on a chair to tie his shoe on his left foot that is on the ground. 16—
Why do you loathe meeting with representatives of Ethiopian alternative
parties and alternative press when you readily meet and hobnob with
Eritrean parties and give interviews to international and Eritrean
press? 17—When
you were invited to Harvard University last year to help the audience
know more about Ethiopia, you did not mention Ethiopia at all in
your entire formal speech. Don’t you think that is odd for one who
heads a regime in a country and not say a word about it—at least
something like ‘I bring you greetings from my fiefdom called
Ethiopia’? Did you think that Harvard savants wanted you to enlighten
them on “Foday Sankho or South Korea?” Are you ashamed of Ethiopia
or was that a reflection of your contempt for the colony and its people?
Please go back and read your speech, which you can download from Walta
website archives. 18--
Why is it that you have not respected and responded positively to a
single civil peaceful plea by unarmed Ethiopians at home and abroad
in the past decade, regarding so many vital matters such as the
following: --To
cease and desist dismantling Ethiopia’s national defense,
infrastructural, educational, industrial, etc. establishments and
shipping much of Ethiopia’s assets to EPLF-Eritrea and to TPLF’s
home base. --Not
to facilitate the secession of Eritrea rendering Ethiopia landlocked.
(When EPLF committed aggression in 1998, you were urged to redeem
Ethiopia’s people and seacoasts severed in 1991.) --To
stop the unjust incarceration and inhuman treatment of all prisoners and
to free all political prisoners forthwith --To
stop making Ethiopians tenants instead of owners of their own Ethiopian
land. --To
release Professor Asrat Weldeyes instead of expediting his suffering and
untimely death, and currently to release Dr Taye Woldesemayat and all
other political prisoners. --To
stop harassing and repressing unarmed Ethiopian students, nationalists,
alternative party leaders, journalists, labor and professional
organizers. --To
stop pillaging the rest of Ethiopia for the benefit of EPLF-Eritrea and
Tigray. --To
stop the division of Ethiopia into killils which are clearly
designed to kill Ethiopia as Ethiopia in the long run, and to give
breathing and teething space for EPLF-Eritrea primarily, and perhaps
also for TPLF-Tigray, in the short-run?” Mr.
Prime Minister, the above items are only a minute portion of tons of
questions and issues one could raise to show you, your flunkeys and
others who support you abroad that you never really stood for Ethiopia
and Ethiopians in the last ten years you have ruled the country. As a
matter of fact, one gets the uncomfortable feeling, Mr. Prime Minister,
that your ears are trained to get only messages that are delivered
through the barrel of the gun. It appears that to you no matter their
numbers, the justice of their causes or the frequency of their civil
pleas, unarmed Ethiopians are, as the Ethiopian saying goes, telba
binchacha band muqecha--like ‘noisy bunch of linseed which can be
pummeled by a single pounder.’ It has to be recognized that de
facto you are in Ethiopia by force of arms. Although the
related issue of whether you are of Ethiopia is well known among
Ethiopians, we leave it up to you to grapple with. If it might help you
find the answer to that problematic, we can share something with you
that you know very, very well. As profiled in the foregoing pages and
documented in volumes and volumes of commentaries you, Mr. Prime
Minister, have not lived, worked or struggled for Ethiopia and for the
vast majority of Ethiopians.
Does this mean you have been working against Ethiopia? Why don’t
we let you sort out that rhetorical question also! Concluding
Remarks
Nowadays, many Eritreans who strongly feel that their would-be “Miracleland” has become a virtual Nightmareland under EPLF strongman Issayass Afewerki and are waging an intensive political struggle to get rid of him peacefully akin to what is happening in Ethiopia. Tberth O.E., is one of those who have been writing incisive pieces in the Internet and elsewhere. In a recent article entitled “With Brutes Like Isaias, Colonialism Looks Bloody Fine.” she said the following: “Injustice is injustice regardless of whether it gets administered by a colonial power or an evil dictator of our own flesh and blood…” Is this what Eritreans and ‘tegadelty’ invested their aspirations and precious lives for? To bring about another ruthless colonial regime?” (On the EPLF-Eritrean side see also, for instance, the online publications of Tesfatsion Medhanie, Saleh Younis, Amb. Hebret Berhe, Dr Alazar Gebre Yesus). Indigenous writers on Ethiopia-Eritrea should only read and learn from each other’s quandaries and tribulations in dealing with dictators. Besides the potentially cathartic and educative effect of such cross reading, there is always the possibility that a new generation of intellectuals may forge a common front to deal with a common malaise and angst. Prime Minister/President Meles probably feels sorry for Mr. Issayass, his comrade-in-arms of long-standing with whom he shared diabolical dreams as well as “wounds” inflicted in the course of the struggles against adversaries in Ethiopia. The two were as inseparable as Siamese twins when they were sowing their winds in Ethiopia till 1998. By a stroke of historic fate, the two are in the same leaking, sinking boat right now at the whirlwind end game of their exposed conspiracy. They sowed the same ill winds in Ethiopia-Eritrea and are now being shaken by the whirlwinds of their own making, which is an instance of poetic justice. To be sure, both are dictators in the generic sense of the word. However, Mr. Issayass’ dictatorship is primarily personal; he does not have a tribal or parochial baggage behind him. One can fight to remove him from the scene and perhaps a few of his personal and his power machine, and if successful, start all over again in the same Eritrean entity. On the other hand, the dictatorship of Mr. Meles is not merely personal but also tribal with all that that implies. Mr. Issayass at least did not chop up his Eritrea into nine killils thereby planting the seeds of its ultimate disintegration. Mr. Meles and his TPLF machine (with EPLF bidding) has imposed a bantustans type of killil system, alienating and then pitting the peoples of Ethiopia against one another with a deliberate aim of obliterating its name, history and integrity. And, of course, he and his comrades have already helped sever a portion of Ethiopian people and territory including its natural seacoasts for the creation of EPLF-Eritrea, for whose cause they have struggled for the last quarter century. TPLF-Tigray “national state” is virtually on the same track as that of EPLF Eritrea. So, Mr. Meles is a more treasonous dictator. He and his TPLF have dragged their whole Tigrayan tribe to be in conflict with the Ethiopian masses. What was cited above about Mr. Issayass--an evil dictator of our own flesh and blood--pales in comparison with what could be said about Mr. Meles--in fact, is being said nowadays by Tigrayans in the Diaspora. The least that can be said about TPLF’s Meles is that he is a treacherous tyrant in what is left of Ethiopia. 12 October 2001 Professor Negussay currently teaches at UCLA in Los Angeles, California. Copyright © 2000 Negussay Ayele -MediaETHIOPIA. Readers may redistribute this article for noncommercial use as long as the text and this notice remain intact. This article may not be sold, reprinted, translated or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author and MediaETHIOPIA. |