The Logistic Base and Military Strategy of the Ethiopian Army: the Campaign and Battle of Adwa, September 1895-February 1896.

By Tsegaye Tegenu
(Part Two of Three)
[Part One] [Part Three]

Resource Acquisition and Allocation in the Gebar Mad! riya System

In the Gebar Mad!riya system, which was the economic basis of the imperial troops of Menelik, ordinary land tax was not privatized. It was under the direct control and administration of the king. It served as the most important source of revenue for the imperial army. In this system land tax was fixed in such a way as to fulfil the needs of acampaign soldier. An ordinary soldier was given gasha land, and a peasant who cultivated gasha land (unit of land measurement) had to pay annually one gundo of honey (ca. 19 kilo) and three dawula (ca 276 Kilo) of grain to a soldier assigned to use the tax as salary. In lieu the payment of grain, the peasant was forced to provide one quna of grind Teff, one quna of grinned Shiro, three quna of grain. In other words, inadition to an obligation to fulfil the food and drinking needs of a soldier, the peasants had the obligation to cut wood and provide grass to war horses. By the Gebar system these quantified needs (ideal needs) of an ordinary campaign soldier served as basis to fix the level of land tax . The amount paid by the individual peasant depended on the size of land holding and was calculated based on the knowledge of land size possessed by the household (mulu, Gemash and Qurman gasha). One of the importance of this type tax assessment was thus its security as an assured amount of income for a soldier and for the permanent putting of a soldier on the field. Direct control over taxation, not only facilitated increasing tax as the need arised, but it also made possible to transfer resources from areas of surplus to areas of scarcity. The system was flexible, and ordinary land tax could be allocated as remuneration for soldiers, recruitment of auxiliary troops, and for remuneration of the clergy. Different institutions, court, church, and imperial troops (chifra), had their own separate revenue (budget) and administration. What belonged to the king and the provincial governors court was called Mad B!t, and what belonged to the territorial troops was called gizat (or Y!m!ngest and Y!shal!qa Gebar), and that belonged to the church was called Simongna. It was such a centrally controlled, state directed and administered system of taxation that was introduced at national level by Menelik during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Expansion of the system at the national level meant increase in the amount of government revenue. Integration of the southern regions into the imperial fiscal system meant broadening of the tax base of the state. Another mechanism in increasing government revenue was the introduction and conduct of land measurement (land survey), known as q!lad. Land survey increased the number and variety of state lands used for remuneration of troops, the clergy, and as pension to retired soldiers. In the early 1870s when the imperial authority was limited only to central Shewa, extended as far as the Awash river, Menelik could collect ordinary land tax from 18,979 Qutr Gebar peasants, and 12,181 peasants registered as Gindeb!l. His government had also a total of 14,368 Mad!riya land . From these tax paying units, the king could collect 124,403 dawula of grain and 33,347 gundo of honey. In a mater of two decades and a half, the imperial revenue from ordinary land tax alone raised to 88,742 gundo honey (i.e., 166% increases), 874,487 dawula of grain (i.e., 602% increases) and 1,905,511 MT$ which was totally new income to the state.

The introduction of Asrat tax in 1894, as a one-tenth payment from the produce of the land, was in itself another innovation of the period. This tax was universal, paid by all categories of people who benefited from the possession and use of land. It included the local nobility, soldiers of M!d!riya state land, and even the Tisena- tenants were liable in their contract to give an additional portion of the grain to help the land owner pay the Asrat tax. In the Rist Gult system extraordinary land tax had the form of F!s!s and T!s!ri. While the former was arbitrary the later was a burden to peasant households. Asrat, as a proportional payment of the produce, replaced the T!sari (billeting) form and the F!s!s tax in northern Ethiopia. Asrat not only avoided the negative sides of billeting, but it also brought a step to tax homogeneity. Other than the ordinary land tax (Gebr), it created different alternative source for remuneration for the regular army, . After one decade of its introduction, the imperial government could collect about 920,593 dawula of grain, an amount that cover the annual grain payment for 90,254 ordinary soldiers. In the Gebar Mad!riya system, direct and indirect taxes were not from the beginning administered by market/private method (Sum!t). Market dues were collected by royal officials called Mislene. Since the 1880s, this type of royal administration facilitated to benefit from an increase in import and export tax during the growing contact with European international trade. Custom receipts on external trade was an important source of court revenue of Menelik. Based on the indication of the volume of import and export trade as well as the level of taxation, one could estimate the amount of revenue the state supposed to collect from import export taxes at Addis Ababa, the capital city, and Harar town. For instance, it was estimated that the empror could obtain a total revenue of 450,550 MT$ from goods imported into and exported from Addis Ababa in 1899-1900. This figure alone is very considerable when compared to indirect tax revenue of Tewedros and Yohannes. Compared to the Rist Gult system, the revenue produced by the Gebar Mad!riya fiscal system was very considerable. By the end of the nineteenth century, Menelik could collect about 6,820,355 MT$ from ordinary and extraordinary land tax. From provincial contribution and custom revenue of Addis Ababa and Harar, the emperor received a revenue amounting to 3,131,428 MT$. The total court and army revenue of Menelik estimated at 9,951,783 MT$. The figure excludes the M! safint Hag!r of northern regions under the Rist Gult system, the region of Bale, many other districts, and sources of income such as commercial judicial fee. It also did not include a great number of state lands which could be used for remuneration of troops, use of the church. State land could be granted as pension to retired soldiers and/or sold for money going to state treasury. In the region of Shewa, for instance, there was about 17,716 Mad!riya lands allocated for soldiers . The 10 million MT$ annual revenue of the Menelik's government was administered by central system, either through the court or the office of governor general. The revenue was used to remunerate troops in the form of q!l!b-and- d!moz. This type of payment is often made to court troops, and it referred to soldiers who received their payment in a fixed quantity of grain and additional sum of money paid annually. Provincial troops received only grain payment, and these soldiers were called Qitabel soldiers. Part of the government revenue was used for another type of remuneration called Qutr Gebar: the soldier was given numbered !bar (counted Gebars), particularly in the regions where the land was not surveyed, and collected the ordinary land tax by themselves. Certain amount of the revenue was allocated for the recruitment of auxiliary troops, who performed auxiliary tasks essential for the success of the campaign. Generally they were referred to Gindeb!l , but they were further qualified depending on the specific task of assignment. The auxiliary function of the troops included transportation of cannon and machine guns, tents, t!r!da-pole, and food staff. A large number of mules, horses and donkeys were raised both under the administration of the court and at the local level. We do not know the total amount of these animals. Those at the court received their fodder from the ordinary land tax paid to the court in the form of the salt, and certain dawula of grain from the Asrat tax. Those at the provincial levels were allowed to retain ten dawula of grain from the Asrat tax as fodder. The cavalry F!r!s!na was not part of the central state expense, i.e., paid out of the total government revenue. The kings household cavalry was called F!r!s Z!b!na and were maintained by domain system, which include land of baldr!s and probably the land of Eqa bet. Those of the provincial cavalry called b!l!g!r f!r!s!na (or w!r!da gend!b!l), and were recruited at district level. These ones consisted mainly of the Balabat (local chiefs). The Balabat served as cavalry force in exchange for tax exemption and received equipment (mainly horse) from the state. During the campaign of Adwa, the w!r!da gend!b!l that followed the Emperor were numbered as 7000 and 8000 .

Patterns of Mobilization and Planning of the Adwa Campaign Inspite of communication and transport problems, in a matter of two months after the call for total mobilization on September 17, 1895, more than 100,000 soldiers were assembled in the specified areas (Addis Ababa, Were Illu, Ashenge, and Mekele). Of these troops, about two-third were raised by the Gebar Mad!riya system. The emperor himself mobilized around 35000 troops commanded by his court officials. The queen also mobilized her own troops numbering to about 6000. The imperial army also consisted the troops raised by governor generals (such as Ras M!konen who commanded on the average 12000 soldiers, D!jazmach Tesema, about 5000, Ras Welde Giorgis about 5000, Ras Bitweded Mengesha Atakim, about 6000, and others). The size of the imperial troops was well within the resource capacity of the system. Troops of the regional princes was on the average 35,000.Of these, Ras Menegesha of Tigray commanded an average about 8000, Ras Mikael of Wello about 8000, King Tekle Haimanot of Gojjam about 6000, Ras Welle of Begemder about 6000, Wagshum Guangul of Wag about 5000 soldiers. Since the 1880s, the emperor imported a substantial number of weapons. It is estimated that for the battle of Adwa Menelik could mobilize 100,000 rifles . If one estimates the price of the cheapest rifle was about eight dollar , by 1896 the emperorhad spent 800,000 dollars. By 1895 the emperor had obtained at least 5,000,000 cartridges , and if each of the cartridge costed a twentieth of a dollar , the value would be 250,000 MT$. These costs did not include the importation of artlilery. There were troops assigned to the corps of gunpowder and shell (ammunition) and were commanded by a B!jirond (a treasure in charge of finance and Gemja B!t, store house, of the palace) and by the Lik! M!kuas, who was also commander of the royal cavalry. When the call for mobilization was made, the court, the provincial govornor and the campaign soldiers were expected to bring their supply with them. The superintendents of the palace, the Azaz, took the responsibility to pack the provision of foodstuffs and drinks for the king . About 600-800 mules were packed with honey (mar-chan) . Unquantified number of tanika butter was also packed . Food staff was loaded with 600-800 mules by the gebar z!mach. The King's portion was packed on 250-280 mules . Unspecified number of sheep and beef cattle were brought to the campaign. They were kept temporarily until they were slaughtered for troop consumption . In addition to the preparation made by the Azaz of the palace, district and local governors Misl!n! (meaning "like my self") and Gult-G!z, who were responsible for the administration of land tax belonging to the palace, were also ordered to prepare provision at intervals on the direction of the march. Except difference in scale, presumably the governor-generals had their own similar form of provision system like that of the emperor. During the time of the campaign, soldiers were supposed to bring senq from their own sources which would last for about twenty days. The food consisted quanta (dried meat), flour, qita (bread), shimbra-grain, dabo kolo and b!sso. These food items do not get spoiled easily and could therefore be kept for a longer period of time. Ranking officers also brought with them male and female household servants. While the men fetched firewood and forage for the animals, the women servants prepared food and drinks. The system of provisioning was organized on the principle of self- sufficiency. But it had different sources. The court and the provincial governors depended largely on sources drawn from their Mad B!t. For the ordinary soldiers, during the campaign a gebar who held one gasha land was obliged to grind five quna of grain or load one gundo of honey on his own donkey .The task of feeding a large number of horses, cattle, sheep, mules and other transport animals was not part of state expense. The provision which these animals require was considerable, if calculated, it would multiply more times the supply for the troops. It appears that there was no supply system prepared for the animals just like for the troops consumption. During the campaign, feeding responsibility was left to the Beklo T!baki himself. Usually campaigns was called after the rainy season was over and when it was time to find abundant grass. During the campaign, tents were laid down in areas where one finds abundant grass and water to feed horses of the cavalry force and the large number of donkeys, draught horses and mules used for transportation means to accompany the army. It is not known if provincial cavalry forces required to bring with them to the war dirkosh levies of their districts. It seemed that the burden of feeding the cavalry was put on countries lying in the direction of the war. In Ethiopia the theatre of military preparation was a culture, and hence there was no wonder for the efficient mobilization of a considerable size of resources for the battle of Adwa. The preparation of the theatre of war encompassed not only a limited period and region (boarder line), but also the whole country. It was done mainly through the Gebar Mad!riya system, which supplied the armed forces with everything necessary for waging military operation and protecting the country from aggression. Preparation for the war was only one component of the military art. Menelik and his commanders had to answer the question how they were going to use the resources collected and for what specific purpose. In such efforts, one needs to study the military capability and strategy of the enemy, examine the resources required for conducting of the war, planning of the war, define the strategic tasks of the armed forces, examine the methods of conducting the war, etc. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail all these complex components of the military art. In what follows an attempt is made to present a discussion of the planning of the war and the ways of conducting the actual fighting. This discussion is based on the account of the chronicle of Menelik . During this period, Italy's military strategy was based on the policy of acquiring vast territory for settlement of landless Italians and source of raw materials for their export industries . The colonial power had an aggressive and territorial expansionist policy which was to be achieved by military conquest. After the death of Emperor Yohannes, taking advantage of the conflict of the regional aristocracy, Italy expanded its aggression territorially occupying the highlands of Eritrea. Because of the great famine that plagued the country, Menelik could not make mobilization to check Italy's advance . This gave Italy the opportunity to continue further its aggression by occupying more territories on the highlands, and crossing the Mereb river the Italian army chased out Ras Mengesha, the ruler of Tigray. They had almost established full control over the region . Italy's military strategy was advanced through the occupation of more territory, and establishment of defence posts on occupied strategic areas and towns . Italy not only made strategic advance of troops but also increased its military capacity. Baraterie, the commander of the Italian army and governor of the colony, had obtained an additional budget of four million lire and ten thousand trained soldiers . Ethiopia's military strategy was different, in its political essence, objectives and methodology of resolving of military affairs. Ethiopia's military strategy during this period was defined by the policy directed at achieving the unity and consolidation of the imperial gizat, and attaining access to the Red sea. The strategic goal was to engage the mainforce of the enemy far north in the territory of the Mereb Melash.The mission was to destroy, defeat, or capture its troops and arsenal. The war had no objectives for piecemeal political and economic liberation of territories, and establishing of fortification posts by the imperial army . In its military objective and method of conducting the war, the Ethiopian army purposely avoided a sequential encounter and building of fortification for a prolonged war. Objective of the strategic operation was not a piecemeal occupation of territories, but to destroy the main enemy army. Military objectives were based on the urgency of bringing the main enemy force to engagement, and get decisive victory through involving the cavalry and infantry forces. Constraints of provision, the nature of the alignment of forces in the ruling class, supply of weapons both in quantity and quality were the major constraints which played role in the making of such strategic goal. Menelik had to follow two strategic lines to achieve the stated military goal. The first one was the concern for the creation of coalition of internal forces, that was the united front of regional princes. The second one was the concern for the organization and planning of the campaign. Prior to the actual engagement, Menelik had established common objectives among the regional princes of northern Ethiopia and ways for their participation in the war. He resolved the problem with Ras Megesha Yohanes; also he concluded some understanding with the princes of Gojjam, Begemder, Wag, and Wello. The Rases agreed to send their troops, provide their gizat as supply area, and to assist in any way needed. It was thus able to line up the troops of princes which consisted about one- third of the mobilized forces. Even at the last days of the war, Ras Sebehat and D! jazmach Hagos who formerly allied with the Italian forces came back to the Ethiopian side and attacked the Italian column behind the rear. The coalition of the Rases thus made possible to workout common plans of actions, and the creation of a single command led by the emperor himself and his delegates. The Italian military leadership counted to exploit the internal conflicts. It envisaged rebellion or the neutrality of the regional princes, but this was a major mistake. Considering available means and reflection of the strategic nature of the war, it could be said that Menelik succeeded in efficient and skilful organization and planning of the campaign. Indeed, the Ethiopian military leaders and troops had long tradition that gave them experience in mastering the high art of movement under difficult conditions. It was a tradition to make long-distance march to close the enemy. The campaign to Adwa was relatively a long march, taking almost 150 days. The size of a days march depended at first on the nature of the road. In the final phase, the rate of the days march was dictated more by security caution and need for supply. In most areas the road was covered with forest and heavey stones; because of this troops were forced to march divided. In some areas such as the designated route to May Weyni, the road was so narrow and scrupulous that troops had to cross one river twenty eight times. The long march was moving in an organized way. Since it was possible to encounter the enemy enroute, march formation was designed to include: forward detachment (to achieve security in the front and serve as covering force), the main body, and the logistic unit. The march formation was organized with regard to a rapid deployment of forces into combat formation. The plan for the march was prepared by the high military leadership consisting of the Rases and order was given by the decision or in consent with the emperor.A coherent campaign plan was prepared based on the strategic objective of the engagement, examination of the nature of coalition of the internal forces, the degree of mobilization, the long distance of the march, aim and position of the enemy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the details on each of the orders, directives, directions and instruction given by the emperor and the higher command of the Rases to control the movement of troops and their execution in combat action. Two month after the mobilzation proclamation, and one moth after the march from Addis Ababa, the pattern of mobilization (planning of the war) appeared as follows : --The first section consisted troops left behind at Addis Ababa to look after security in the absence of the emperor. Before he left Addis Ababa, the emperor ordered Ras Darge, D!gazmach Haile Mariam and Wehin Azaz Welde Tsadic, to remain behind and look after the state administration and security. --The second category consisted troops assigned to look after boarder security menaced by conflict. The emperor ordered Aba Jiffar of Jima, D!jazmach Gebre Egziabhere of Leqe- Wellega, D!jazmach Jote and Kawo Tona of Wellamo (Welayita) to return back and keep order in the south western part of Ethiopia.--The third section concerned group of the imperial army sent to open another front on the eastern boarder. While at Wuchali, the Emperor send a message to Ras Welde Giorigis, governor of Keffa and Ras Tesema, governor of Illibabur who had stayed behind, to march to Awsa (eastern boarder) instead of coming to meet him at Ashenge. Menelik sent forces to the eastern boarder, for Italy had began to supply local forces with guns and artilleries with the aim to instigate internal rebellion. --The fourth section consisted the main military force dispatched north to engage the main enemy force. When the emperor was at Wer Illu. he ordered the forces of Ras Mikael, hereditary governor of Wello, Ras Welel, brother of Empress Tayitu, Ras Bitweded Mengesha of Tigray, Ras Mekonnen, Ras Alula, Wagshum Guangul, Dejach Welde, Fitawurari Gebeyehu, Fitawurari Tekle, Liq!-M!kuas Adnew, and Q!gnazmach Tafese to engage the Italian force in a battle. He notified that they could send him a message, if they found it not easy to fight.--The fifth armed group consisted of the force of the emperor and the empress who stayed behind as a reserves. The army of the emperor was led by Fitawurari Habte Giorgis, commander of the imperial army, Fitawrarri Gebeyehu, and artilery commanders such as B! jironed Balcha, and Lik!-M!kuas Abatae, and Lik!-M!kuas Adnew commander of the cavalry. The total number of troops of the emperor and the empress was estimated at about 41,000 men and these troops were supposed to serve as reserves. The plan had envisaged the various courses open to the enemy and considered guarding of boarders, opening of another front at Awsa, and giving emphasis on strategic reserve of armed forces. The plan evaluated the chances of success. It also predicted both the enemy's probable responses and the main changes which could occur in such cases.

Types and Methods of Combat Actions The campaign plan, adopted by the emperor and the Rases, was not actually an operational plan. Control of troop movement and actual conducting of engagements in war was left to the initiation of the Rases. They did so following the course of action determined by the emperor and the council of the Rases. The Ethiopian campaign plan deals on measures taken in mobilization and moving of troops far deep into the enemy territory by passing small detachment force posted as defence and deterrence. The military action of the Ethiopian armed forces was basically a type of strategic offensive accomplished through the opening of two strategic fronts to defeat the main groupings of enemy troops deep into its territory. The Ethiopian force which was dispatched at the beginning led under the command of governor-generals met on its way, at Alage, a fortified Italian force. The governor generals held a council meeting and decided to by pass the Italian fortification and proceed forward. According to the strategic objective war and the conducting of the campaign plan, the Ethiopian high command was given the instruction to avoid battle for each position of the enemy force (unit). According to the concept of the campaign, engagement was envisaged with the main enemy force far deep in the territory controlled by it. One of the commander, Fitawurari Gebeyehu, was however, unable to leave without fighting the Italians. Outside of the original plan, he led his force and attacked the Italian fortification. He was joined by the force of Q!gnazmach Tafese. The Italian force was routed and another 5000 Italian forces sent in aid of the fortification were also chased and disbursed. Though the Ethiopian forces scored victory in its first engagement, the two commanders were detained since they fought on their own initiative without order from the high military leadership. They were released later when the emperor arrived and saw their case.Until the incident of Alage, the march was conducted first without an immediate threat of encountering the enemy. After the news of the first engagement, the march was made in anticipation of meeting the enemy. At Wefla, two days after the first engagement, the emperor held military review, guns weresaluted and fired. All military commanders lined up with their soldiers wearing their traditional uniform and decoration, which "glittered like the sun" the whole day. This was in the tradition of the Ethiopian army practised to assess readiness of the troops and affirm imminence of a battle. The emperor held military review to see the level of the combat readiness of the army and to give them signal to prepare to carry out assigned missions. The emperor saw the level of personnel, arms and military equipment, availability of necessary reserves, the high level of combat moral, the mutual support of the forces of the Rases in the event of combat, the discipline and organization of the army. Since the military review at Wefla, troops were marching in complete combat readiness to perform the combat mission. The military review brought the troops into full combat readiness, in possible areas of military operation. The advancing force of the Rases met another strong fortification of the Italians in Mekele, the capital town of Tigray. In this town, the Italians were building strong fortification for the last four months. This time the forces of the Rases encircled the fortification and waited for the coming of the emperor and an order to attack. The emperor artillery commanders shelled the fortification for two weeks until the enemy surrendered completely. Had the forces of the Rases attacked and captured the water source the enemy earlier, the attack would not have lasted two weeks . According to the chronicler, Menelik saw taking measure against surrendered Italian forces as a disrespect to the Ethiopian state, and allowed the Italians to pack and leave in order that they join their main base at Adigrat. He bought 500 camels and mules and gave them to load their ammunition including artillery. He ordered Ras Mekonnen, to accompany them and guard their security. Though, this had disappointed some of the Ethiopian soldiers, it was suspected that the idea was to send Ras Mekonen as a cover for the further advance of the Ethiopian troops far into the interior of the enemy zone, without being surprised by the main force stationed at Adigrat. Menelik and his commanders left Mekele and marched cautiously by passing Adigrat, the strong base of the Italian forces. They encamped at Agula, Genfel; on the fifth day they encamped at Hawzen, and after two days at Harhar, then at WereA and to Tsadiya. After two days the emperor encamped at Zata, and then he left for Gendebeta. Seeing that the Italians were not coming out from their fortification and engage him in battle, the emperor decided to move to Hamasen and left for Aba Gerima Gult. After two days of march, they camped at Adwa.As the main force of the two armies were getting close the troop movement was done in anticipation of a surprise attack from the enemy. The characteristic of the march had also changed: the length of the route and duration it took from the initial place to the far point of an assembly area became shorter. The problem of promising became also acute. The emperor held council meetings to discuss the developments. It was decided to attack the Italian position in the next morning, but Ras Mengesha argued against this idea stating the danger of attacking fortified position. He told the king about the death of his father, Emperor Yohannes, when he tried to attack the strong fortified position of the Mahdist of Sudan in 1889. For two days they discussed again on operational strategy, and finally, they dropped the idea of attacking the fortified Italian position and agreed to advance forward to Hamassen, the seat of the colonial government . At that moment the Italian troops had provision left only good enough to feed for one week, and Baratieri decided to attack the Ethiopian force, which was supposed to march to Hammasen in the next morning. At night the Italian troops left their position at Adigrat and attacked the Ethiopian forces in the morning at 5 a.m. local time. The Ethiopian forces were not ready. About one- third of the forces were left either to look for provision, or some went to Aksum to visit religious center, the Saint Merry church. The rest were not ready for any engagement according to the tradition of Ethiopian battle. The battle of Adwa can be called a meeting engagement, which is a variety of offensive type of combat action. It was a clash of troops of the two sides advancing toward each other. From the out set, both sides attempted to carry out the assigned missions by means of a strategic offensive. The Italians defeated and chased out the forces of Ras Mengesha and took important areas of terrain in the region of Tigray to defend their stronghold in Eritrea. The Ethiopian forces conducted a long march north to penetrate deep into the enemy zone and engage its main force. At Adwa there was a rapid closing of the two sides, and they entered into combat. Italy took the initiative, made a surprise attack (timely decision), through rapid commitment of the main forces, and carrying out attacks against the main center, and flanks of the Ethiopian army, to give it a sudden blow. But Italy could not retain the initiative. The Italians had an operational plan that had a detailed precise on combat action. It was drawn up in detail on a map by Baratieri, the Italian commander and jointly with senior commanders. The operational plan elaborated the performance each unit, their mission, their position, direction of their main attack, times of accomplishment, and their mutual support. This operational plan failed to conceptualize the alignment, (i.e., grouping) of the Ethiopian forces and their possible operation. In the Ethiopian strategic culture, conducting of engagement was left to the freedom of the commander and individual initiative of the soldiers. Even if the Ethiopian troops were not in a combat form, the laying out of campaign and the position of the troops was in such a structure that made combat formation of troops very rapid. The Ethiopian way of military camping had an in- built defence mechanism and flexibility for the manoeuvre of troops to counter attack. Traditionally, at camping, force were organised at least eight-order (d!nb) taking position with specific task: front camp, end!rase, bal!mual, guard camp, left camp, right camp, rare-back camp, and agafari. Each camp had at least two or three captain units and was commanded by a sal!qa, who hold titles that had strategic combat functions. For instance, the front camp and the left camp were commanded by D!gazmach who covers the center and the rear part in time of combat. The end!rase and the guard camps were commanded by titles holders of Grazmach who units were assigned to attack the right flank of the enemy. The bal!mual, the rare and left camps were commanded by sal!qa who had title of Q!gnazmach and during combat their force was assigned to hit the left flanks of the enemy. The camp of the agafari was led by a sal!qa who had title of Fitawurari, responsible for frontal advance attack . In combat action, camp commanders were expected to manoeuvre the troops in positions of left, right, center and rare as indicated by the strategic functions of the title. The manoeuvre is often accomplished by a close envelopment of an enemy flanks. Though the Ethiopian army was surprised it was not difficult to search for a favourable position with respect to the enemy and to advance and make regrouping if the need arised. The very structural formation of troops was flexible enough for rapid manoeuvre of troops in a moon like shape, the essence of which consisted attacking of the outer flanks of the enemy while concentrating superiority of force in the middle for a subsequent annihilation. It seemed that the plan of Baratieri focused not in response to the structural formation and combat initiative of the Ethiopian troops, mainly it emphasised on the method of employing weapons (effective use of his firepower) following the European style of warfare. In the Italian style of warfare there was a basic reliance on firepower. Improvements in firearms (lighter and rapid firing guns, for instance) and changing battle tactics (line formation, and shoulder-to-shoulder drill for volley technics) were aimed to increase and ensure effective and maximum firepower. Weapons were only effective when employed in a strictly disciplined way and steadiness became thus a crucial factor in tactics dominated by firearms. In the Ethiopian context, there was no tradition of reliance on fire power. Until the second half of the nineteenth century firearms plaid limited roll in battles. Their numbers were limited and their qualities were relatively poor as most of them belonged to earlier periods. Therefore, there was no dependence on effective use of firearms, thus no linear battle formation and no need for drill. The Ethiopian style stressed more on mobility and manoeuvre than on linear formation and on rank co- ordination. It was designed for short and decisive battle than for siege warfare. There was reliance on mass manoeuvre and a fast-moving confrontation involving cavalry and infantry forces. Battlefield tactics depended much on the nature of the mass manoeuvre and identification of the weakest links of the enemy. Actions were not characterised by battle formations, rather they were dominated by individual initiatives, mobility and energy. Leadership and morale were ingredients important for success!!

(end of part two of three)
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