![[ History of
the Battle of Adwa ]](ad-h-pr3_files/ad-h-hi2.gif)
The Italian force lost the
battle of Adwa not
because of tactical error, though chances have a great role in
the outcome of a battle.
The main reason was that in many ways they did not know the
enemy they were confronting.
Based on the general and strategic goal of the war which they
set and considering the
budget constraints of the Italian government, Barateir's
preparation for the war and its
planning was (optimal) what could be desired. However, from the
out set, they had no good
knowledge of the response capability of the Ethiopian army,
military thinking of its
commanders and the operational culture. During their preparation
for the war they counted
on exploiting the internal conflict between the princes, and in
many ways, they encouraged
internal rebellion and/or to assure neutrality. They failed to
see that the Ethiopian
aristocracy had by this time built a system in which all could
benefit. For instance,
Menelik had never collected or demanded annual revenue from the
regional princes of the
north. In fact, exchanging of gifts and entertaining of guests
was one of the outstanding
expenditure of Menelik's court. As discussed above Menelik was
wealthier when compared to
Tewedros and Yohannes, and the imperial army had sufficient
material resources. The
Italian military leadership never expected Menelik to raise such
a considerable number of
forces. Their calculation was 30,000 men, but through the Gebar
Mad!riya system, the
emperor alone could mobilize two thirds of the combat force in
the shortest possible time,
inspite of the problem of communication, transport and the rainy
season. The Italian
experience was limited to sporadic engagement of troops raised
by the Rist Gult system.
This gave them wrong understanding of the capacity of the Gebar
Mad!riya system. Finally,
their operational plan was conceived in the battle thinking and
style of the European
system, which could not predict the greater mobility, individual
initiation and rapid
manoeuvring capacity that charactreized the Ethiopian troop
formation. Italy needed more
resources than its budget allowed, and better understanding of
the Ethiopian strategic
lines and art of military operation, if it wanted to achieve its
colonial policy. Menelik
on the other hand could not continue his military success to
dislodge the Italians out of
Ethiopia. It was not possible to establish the Gebar Mad!riya
system in northern Ethiopia
owing to the historical and local conditions. It was difficult
to reform the Rist Gult
system in such a way that would give the state independence in
the control and use of
resources. Tewedros and Yohannes had tried, and working out of
the system led to the
tragic end of Tewedros. Menelik, though he could not inject
fiscal and military reforms in
the Rist Gult system, following the tradition, in 1889/90, he
had appointed D!jazmach.
Meshesha as governor of Serae and Akale Guzay to hinder the
advance of the Italian, who
were stationed in Asmara, province of Hamasen. His move was
opposed by Ras Mengesha who
saw as an intrude in his imperial privilege. D!jazmach Meshesha
was disarmed, and later
when he fought against Italians he received no support . The
presence of imperial power in
the north needed Gebar Mad!riya system to support it. Imperial
troops had to be
remunerated and provided with provision to carry out their
assigned task. Since the
economy was non-moneterized, they were not paid in cash and get
their supply from the
market. Food and provisioning of other needs had to be brought
through direct control of
the labour and product of the peasantry. In the making of such a
way stood the organized
interest of the Rist peasant community and the local Gult!gna,
and above them the regional
prince. Appointment of an imperial governor became difficult,
and sending of troops during
the great famine that scourged people and cattle alike was
impossible. When troops were
sent as was done by the campaign of Adwa it was not without
experiencing difficulties. In
the last days of the battle the problems of supply of provision
to a large army was
becoming more acute to the extent of dictating the movement of
soldiers. The decision to
march to Hammasen was influenced more by problem of provision
than by preference for a
favourable terrain for combat. The form of the economy and the
local and regional interest
kept by the Rist Gult system practically made it difficult to
station an imperial army in
the north. Going beyond the capacity was an adventure. The
remnant Italian soldiers
numbering about were gathering at Adigrat, the Italian
government had already committed
four million lire and 10,000 soldiers who were expected to
arrive Massawa and relieve the
5,000 Italian soldiers encircled on eastern Qesela. In addition,
as discussed in the
campaign plan, the king had envisaged problem of internal
security, and fear from the
adjacent colonial powers of Britain and France. Interestingly,
enough earlier military
barriers were now sneaking back and posing constraint, and
forcing Menelik to follow the
strategic culture of Yohannes and Alula. In spite of their
victory and concentration of
troops, emperor Alula and Yohannes could not dislodge the
Egyptian force, and then the
Italians which they defeated at Dogali, and which they
threatened it at Seati. Menelik,
inspite of his success in the making of the Gebar Mad!riya
system, the form of the economy
and the Rist Gult system compelled him to accept the status quo.
What the colonial case of
Eritrea shows was the weakness and the problem of the Rist Gult
system to withstand the
increasing challenge of colonial aggression. The interplay of
factors specific to a given
polity govern the way in which it formulates strategy. The way
modern Ethiopia makes
strategy differs from the way Menelik's Ethiopia made it. The
form of the economy, the
fiscal and military organization of the state was different. It
is erroneous, thus, to
judge the past with the influence of the present day military
strategic thinking and
concept. Military strategy is a peculiar national culture
belonging to a definite
historical period.
Notes Among others, see Rubenson, S. (1976), The Survival
of Ethiopian
Independence. London; idem., (1964), Wichale XVII. The Attempt
to Establish a Protectorate
over Ethiopia. Addis Ababa; Marcus, H. The Lief and Times of
Menelik II: Ethiopia,
1844-1913. Oxford.In its broadest definition the term logistic
signifies the total process
by which the human and material resources of a country are
mobilized and directed toward
the accomplishment of military ends. Logistic deals with the
fundamental problems of
mobilizing, moving and supplying the large and disparate body
which constitutes an army.
The logistic base of warfare comprise the elements of manpower,
provisioning, and supply
of war materials. Identification of the essence of the period
and analysis on the type of
social system will appear in a forth coming work titled The
Evolution of Ethiopian
Absolutism. The Genesis and the Making of the Fiscal Military
State, 1696-1913. In this
paper only the major properties of the Rist Gult and the Gebar
Maderiya system are
discussed by way of reference to the battles. The evolution and
gradual development of the
Gebar Maderiya system, and some of the argument lines and source
materials, and figures
used to discuss the two types of systems will appear in this
forth coming work.
The evolution and development of the Rist Gult system can be
traced as far back as the
beginning of the Zagwe period. This crisis is commonly known as
the wars of Ahmed Gran and
Oromo ethnic group settlement.
For further discussion and references see Tsegaye Tegenu (1994),
"A Revolution from
Above? Change in the Fiscal and Military Organization of the
Ethiopian State,
1855-1913", in Marcus, H. (ed.), New Trends in Ethiopian
Studies. Papers of the 12th
International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. V.I. pp. 1007-
1010.
Zenebe, The Chronicle of King Theodore of Abyssinia. Translated
by Littmann, E. 1902.
text. p. 35. For a discussion on the fiscal reforms of the kings
see Tsegaye Tegenu
(1994).
See, Pankhurst, R. and Girma Selassie Asfaw (1979), Tax Records
and Inventories of Emperor
Tewedros of Ethiopia 1855-1868. London.
Kings of Zemene Mesafint were poor. See for instance the
comments of the chroniclers, in
Pankhurst, R. (1985), "Ethiopian Taxation Prior to the Time
of Menelik: A Collection
and Analysis of Estimates, Part II., in North East African
Studies, VII, 1: 23, 24. For
further discussion and source material see Tsegaye Tegenu
(1994).
See the letter in Rubenson, S. (ed.), Tewedros and His
Contemporaries 1855-1868. Acta
Aethiopica V. II., p. 354. See Bairu Tafla, ed. (1977). A
Chronicle of Emperor Yohannes IV
1872-1889. Wiesbaden.
This figure is calculated by deducting 30% of the 69504 MT$
total land tax of Tigray
collected during the reign of Tewedros. Gults reinstituted by
Yohannes had decreased
govornment revenue from ordinary land tax by about 30%. The
figure obtained by such
calculation is similar to the estimation made by contemporary
observers for the year 1868
at the time before coronation when Yohannes was in control of
the whole of Tigray, Quoted
in Pankhrust (1968), 536.
See Pankhurst, R. (1968), State and Land in Ethiopian History,
p. ; Fekadu Begna (1990),
Land and the Peasantry in Northern Wello 1941-74: Y!jju and Raya
and Qobbo Awragas. M.A.
Thesis in History, Addis Ababab University.
Quoted in Pankhurst, R. (1968), Economic History of Ethiopia,
1855- 1935, p. 536. Ibid.,
525.
Analysis of the sources of revenue and further documentation of
evidence appear in the
forthcoming work.
In the case of Amisho, rent was used as a level to fix payment
of land tax, see Amisho.
The figures are results of calculation made based on the data
listed in the book of
Mahteme Selassie, Zekre Neger. For further comments and
illustration of the figures in
table forms will appear in a forth coming work. Actually grant
in land was not as such
grant of land, it was giving right to collect land tax by the
beneficiary himself.
The term Gidebel had different uses: it referred to the W!r!da
cavalry troops, it referred
to troops in the transport corps and finally to the groups of B!
l!muwal-constructors.
About 16 localities and countries were reserved as Baldres to
feed the animals. (MS 23).
Gebre Selassie (1959), p. 226
For the various estimation of soldiers and for the names of
princes and governors who
participated in the battle see Pankhurst, R. (1968), Economic
History of Ethiopia,
1800-1935, Addis Ababa, pp. 555f. Ibid., p. 601. Ibid., p. 537.
Ibid. Ibid.
For the list of food items and quantities see Mahteme Selassie
(1962 E.C.), Zekre Neger.
Addis Ababa, p. 51. If one mule carried two Gundo honey, the
total pack would be enough
for an average of 336,000 people. If one makes calculation based
on the figure given on
monthly supply of the royal banquets, and if that is multiplied
by the number of campaign
days, a total of 500 Tanika-butter was needed for the campaign.
An average of 80 tons of
food stuff mainly consisting Baso, Dirqosh-dried bread, salt and
pepper was needed for the
campaign.
For 10 000 people an average of 72 000 cattle were needed for
the campaign excluding the
fasting days. The supply of meat was undertaken by the system of
Weregenu. About 409 Gasha
lands (18040 hector land) were reserved as Weregenu, areas
selected for good pasture and
abundance of water (see Mahteme Selassie (1962. p.23). In these
districts government
cattle were raised, by Gebars, owner cultivators whose tax
obligation was only herding of
government cattle and during campaign they took with them the
Senga and sheep and herd
them on the way to the battle (ibid., p 117-118). Mahteme
Selassie, (1962), p. 110. Gebre
Selassie (1959 E.C.), Tarik! Z!m!n z!_Dagmawi Menelik Negus! N!g!
st z!-Etiyopiya. Addis
Ababa. See Tekeste Negash (1987), Italian Colonialism in
Eritrea, 1882-1941. Policies,
Praxis and Impact. Uppsala. Gebre Selassie (1959 E.C.), p. 222.
See Berkeley, G. (1902),
The Campaign of Adwa and the Rise of Menelik. London; Marcus, H.
(1975), The Lief and
Times of Menelik II Ethiopia 1844-1913. Oxford, pp. 155f. When
compared to other regions
of Africa, the pattern of colonialism in east and the horn of
Africa was charactrised by
pre-emptive policy of the colonialist countries using force as a
means. In other regions
of Africa, colonialism had at first used such means as debt,
trade, and mining capital
before actual military occupation. In north Africa mounting debt
led to military
colonization, in west Africa the growth of trade and ferries
rivalries of the merchant
class led to European involvement and conquest. Mining capital
became the source of
colonization of southern Africa. The horn and east Africa were
colonized as a result of
intensifying inter-European rivalries. An attempt to contrast
the various patterns of
colonization in Africa reveals the military strategic goal of
Italy. For the various
process and patterns of colonization in Africa, see Zeleza, T.
(1993), A Modern Economic
History of Africa.
V.I. The Nineteenth Century. Oxford. pp. 343-422. Moreover,
contrasting the various
process of colonization with and in the context of the internal
forces and development in
Ethiopia, reveals as well some 'secrete' of Ethiopian
independence. Details on the study
of internal reforms will appear in the coming work. See
Berkeley, G. (1902), The Campaign
of Adwa and the Rise of Menelik. London.
Imperial control over the northern areas could only be achieved
by the Gebar Mad!riya
system, which was in effect establishment of a centalized fiscal
system and militarized
administration. Establishing imperial troops in these regions,
or the Gebar Mad!riya
system could not be achieved due to existence of well entrenched
local and regional
interest represented in the type of the Rist Gult system. For
further discussion see below
page...
See Gebre Selassie (1959 E.C.), pp. 226, 230-231, 236. See the
comments of Berkeley, G.
(1902), section on the Mekele encounter.
While at Adwa, on the first of March, the emperor received a
message about the success on
the Awsa front. For the various camping order and titles of the
commanders see Lule Ras
Kasa Hailu Ast!dad!r D!nb. Segawi ena M!nf!sawi. B! K!fil.
Manuscript. Institute of
Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. p. 10. See Gebre
Selassie (1959), pp. 212, 222
![[Adwa
Home Page]](ad-h-pr3_files/adwa2.gif){kind=small}
ADWA Page Sponsored by EthCITA
Layout and Graphics Designed by Jomo Design .
Copyright © 1996 Jomo Design. All Rights Reserved. Text content
provided by EthCITA. Jomo
Design is not responsible for the materials in this page except
for the graphics. e-mail: